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Abstract 
 
 This Article contributes a novel idea to the literature on capital market 
gatekeepers: positive incentive systems for gatekeepers to perform functions not required 
of them in exchange for rewards if they perform the functions successfully.  Capital 
market gatekeeping theory relies upon the reputations that gatekeepers are assumed to 
command and protect backstopped by negative threats of legal liability for failure to 
perform legally mandated functions.  The ineffectiveness of many gatekeepers during the 
late 1990s and early 2000s revealed practical limitations of the reputational constraint 
and the reforms that responded to the failures continue to emphasize the legal duties and 
legal liability that gatekeepers face.  Adversely, that emphasis discourages gatekeepers 
from willingness to perform desired functions—such as to detect for fraud—whereas the 
positive approach induces performance of such functions.  Without necessarily displacing 
existing reputation constraints and liability strategies, adding an incentive system as a 
public policy lever could promote gatekeeper effectiveness and poses little downside risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approximate Word Count:  24,000 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law, Boston College (through 2006-07) and George Washington University (effective 2007-
08).  Thanks to John Coffee, Melvin Eisenberg, Claire Hill, Alan Palmiter and other participants in 
Columbia University Law School’s conference, “Gatekeepers Today: The Professions after the Reforms” 
(Sept. 29, 2006), where I presented an earlier version of this Article. 
 
CARROTS FOR VETOGATES: 
INCENTIVE SYSTEMS TO INCREASE  
CAPITAL MARKET GATEKEEPER EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 3  
I. THEORY .................................................................................................................... 6 
       A.   Conceptions ..................................................................................................... 6 
                1.   Gatekeepers............................................................................................... 7 
                2.   Whistleblowers.......................................................................................... 8 
                3.   Hybrids.................................................................................................... 10 
       B.   Conditions...................................................................................................... 11 
                1.   Reputation ............................................................................................... 13 
                2.   Liability................................................................................................... 15 
                3.   Assessment.............................................................................................. 17 
II. FAILURE ................................................................................................................. 18 
       A.   Diminished Reputation Constraints .............................................................. 19 
                1.   Partners.................................................................................................... 19 
                2.   Firms ....................................................................................................... 20 
                3.   Professions .............................................................................................. 21 
       B.   Reduced Liability Risk ................................................................................... 23 
       C.   Systemic Factors............................................................................................ 24 
III.  CARROTS ............................................................................................................. 27 
       A.   A General Model ........................................................................................... 27 
                1.   Intuition................................................................................................... 27 
                2.   Rational Economics ................................................................................ 31 
                3.   Behaviorism ............................................................................................ 35 
       B.   Private Arrangements.................................................................................... 37 
                1.   Services ................................................................................................... 37 
                2.   Contracts ................................................................................................. 39 
                3.   Teams ...................................................................................................... 43 
     C.   Public Recognition .......................................................................................... 45 
                1.   Culture..................................................................................................... 45 
                2.   Functions................................................................................................. 47 
                3.   Effects ..................................................................................................... 48 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 52 
 2
INTRODUCTION 
 
 An abundant literature addresses how third-party intermediaries in securities 
transactions stake their reputations when attesting to the veracity of first-party, enterprise, 
assertions.  The literature richly evaluates how such third-party “gatekeepers” are 
motivated to promote fair enterprise reporting based on the value of their respective 
reputations for doing so and backed by some risk of legal liability for failure.  Yet, until 
recently, almost completely absent from this literature is any attention to how a regime 
can supply direct incentives into the gatekeeping function through positive inducements. 
Scholars are lately becoming more interested in this fresh approach.1  This Article aims 
to enhance this emerging perspective.  
 
 Enterprises seeking access to capital entice investment by offering a compelling 
opportunity.  A complex combination of forces shape the character of the reports they 
provide to potential investors.  Pressures of morality and reputation incline managers to 
produce fair reporting while those of chicanery and short-sightedness sway them to 
provide misleading accounts.  These forces operate at both the enterprise level and among 
individual agents.  As an institution, the enterprise can design internal systems to shape 
the culture to lead individuals either towards fair or misleading reporting.   
 
 An enterprise can bolster an inclination towards fair reporting by hiring and 
paying third parties to examine and vouch for its reports. The common examples are 
using outside accountants to audit and attest to financial matters and outside lawyers to 
investigate, prepare and endorse narrative business information.  While these third-parties 
can face competing pressures similar to those the enterprise faces, pressures toward 
misleading presentation are more attenuated when the third-party provides such services 
for a large numbers of enterprises.  Third-parties with large client bases have less to gain 
and more to lose from complicity in misleading reporting with any given enterprise.   
 
 Law can contribute to shaping an enterprise’s inclination toward fair or 
misleading reporting through a combination of positive reinforcement or negative threats.  
Law and legal scholarship focus nearly entirely on negative threats.  Lawyers and 
scholars invariably struggle to design liability regimes to induce fair reporting.  Law thus 
imposes duties on enterprises, individuals, outside accounting and law firms and their 
individual professional employees.   These duties are backed by risk of legal liability, 
which can be criminal or civil and include money damages, prison terms, fines, license 
revocations and the like.  
 
 Complex layers of liability analysis result.  The enterprise is potentially liable as a 
firm and some of its individual employees also face exposure.  Despite such legal 
                                                 
1 See Tamar Frankel, Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Reward Honest Corporations, 62 BUS. LAW. 161 
(2006) (offering “honest corporations” exemptions from certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); 
David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest Proposal for Granting Immunity to Lawyers Who 
Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1825 (2004) (offering transactional immunity to 
securities lawyers who first report violations of law to authorities).  
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deterrence at the enterprise level, detection of mis-reporting is not assured and related 
enforcement may be ineffective or ultimate sanctions insufficient.  To backstop these 
gaps that allow mis-reporting to persist, law imposes similar negative threats against 
outside third parties that an enterprise engages in its reporting exercises. These apply to 
the law and accounting firms that an enterprise retains as well as firm partners and other 
employees.   
 
 Yet law never supplies positive inducements (even lighter sanctions for 
conscientious enterprises or gatekeepers are weaker sticks, not carrots).  True, analysis 
also emphasizes reputation but mainly because gatekeepers put it at risk when attesting to 
the veracity of an enterprise’s assertions, meaning this likewise operates more as a stick 
than as a carrot.  One consequence of the existing regime’s emphasis on liability threats is 
to generate impressive professional resistance to undertaking a variety of potentially 
useful functions.  Examples include how the auditing profession has long resisted any 
undertaking to detect for fraud in financial audits and how the legal profession has long 
resisted any undertaking to conduct due diligence exercises in preparing public offerings 
of securities.  
 
 The following analysis examines the prevalent obsession with liability risk and 
reputation to develop new insights into the possible use of positive incentives to 
supplement these negative inducements.  To simplify for illustration, consider a mix of 
sticks and carrots in a model.  Suppose an enterprise is concerned about employee 
drinking on the job.  The stick approach to regulation imposes fines when inebriation is 
discovered, which can be imposed on the individual employee or on supervisors (the 
functional equivalent of gatekeepers).  The carrot approach would award merit points for 
sobriety, which can be given to employees and/or supervisors.   A combination of sticks 
and carrots would likely increase the probability of optimal system design—minimizing 
drinking on the job. 
 
 The prevailing regime of securities gatekeepers is overwhelmingly a sticks-
oriented system, based on reputation at risk and legal liability threats.  That system failed 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s and yet reforms concentrate on reconfiguring the 
type and combination of sticks in use.  For example, many emphasize the reduced threat 
of auditor liability during that period and respond by prescribing enhanced penalties.2  
Others point to factors that reduced auditor investment in reputation, such as industry 
concentration (and reformers prescribe breaking up large firms to reduce it), how partner 
incentives differ from firm-level incentives (and reformers prescribe realignment through 
various forms of vicarious liability), and the proliferation of non-audit services (and 
reformers prescribe restricting these).  No reforms have considered, as this Article does, 
offering an additional but different set of inducements altogether. 
                                                 
2 E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 
1403, 1403-05, 1409-10 (2002); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 14-21 (2006); William W. Bratton, Jr., Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder 
Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1350 (2002); William W. Bratton, Jr., Shareholder Value and Auditor 
Independence, 53 DUKE L.J. 439, 470 (2003). 
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 This Article’s title, Carrots for Vetogates, refers to explicit compensation to 
gatekeepers who deny access to capital markets (either for an enterprise as a whole or as 
to individual transactions it seeks to pursue) unless corrections are made.  The term 
vetogates is adapted from Professor Eskridge’s coinage that designates the occasions 
when the passage of legislation is inhibited by legislative gatekeepers who hobble the 
process—activating levers called vetogates.3  Political culture makes it difficult to get 
legislation passed; business culture is committed to getting the deal or audit done.   
 
 True, auditors increasingly severed clients during the mid-2000s, but only smaller 
companies where fees do not justify risks.4  Yet the frauds of the late 1990s and early 
2000s involved large companies.  So despite changes, auditor vetogating may be too rare.  
Evidence as to law firm relationships with high-risk clients is more diffuse, but anecdotal 
inference at least plausibly justifies an inquiry into whether a carrot-based merit system 
may contribute greater willingness among lawyers to activate vetogates by denying 
access to capital markets unless corrections are made. 
 
 This Article uses a specific decision-making calculus that capital market 
gatekeepers are assumed to employ.  A gatekeeper is invited, explicitly or implicitly, to 
acquiesce or participate in mis-reporting.  It weighs the gains from doing so against the 
expected costs of inculpation. Gains are context-specific and may range from direct 
payments or indirect benefits such as continued revenue streams from providing 
additional services to the enterprise.  The expected loss is a function of the probability of 
inculpation times the liability sanctions imposed plus the diminution of reputation value.  
The model that this Article discusses adds to the calculus new gains from preventing 
misleading reporting, adding carrots to offset gains arising from complicity.  
 
 Part I considers the theory of capital market gatekeeping. It presents the 
conceptual underpinnings of various components of this model of promoting capital 
market integrity, including discussing various forms that gatekeeping assumes and how a 
combination of reputation and liability risks sustains the existing system.  Part II analyzes 
recent experience that shows limitations on the theory in practice, including limitations 
that continue despite various reforms.  From this fairly extensive review offered to 
provide context, a carrot-based merit system emerges as a potential means of meeting 
some of these limitations and adding new useful features to the gatekeeping function. 
 
 Part III explores a carrot-based merit system.  Its prescriptive discussion 
concentrates on auditors as the model gatekeeper and lawyers as an emerging gatekeeper, 
although some of the analysis leading up to it in Parts I and II also considers other 
                                                 
3  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 671, 677 (1999); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 66-67 (3rd ed. 2001); see 
infra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
4 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 
84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 348, n. 148 (“In 2003, over 1460 public companies changed auditors, which was the 
highest number in at least five years.”). 
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gatekeepers for illustrative purposes.   Carrot systems for those gatekeepers can be 
tailored, as some examples of application to auditors and lawyers suggest.  The Article 
emphasizes auditors because they are the quintessential gatekeeper.  Indeed, auditors are 
the only professionals that public enterprises must engage before making a public 
offering and—even after recent reforms—the only professionals charged with speaking 
independently of an enterprise’s management. The Article’s supplemental emphasis on 
lawyers suggests that such merit systems can be generalized to other capital market 
gatekeepers too.   
 
 The analysis highlights how the heavy concentration placed on liability threats—
by the existing system, recent reforms and throughout the literature—has the perverse 
effect of discouraging gatekeepers from willingness to perform vital functions.  That 
makes a strong independent argument to inquire into how an additional but entirely 
different public policy lever could be activated, an inquiry that points directly to offering 
positive inducements to encourage gatekeepers to perform those vital functions.  While 
the Article cannot provide all the details of a comprehensive incentive program 
applicable for all gatekeepers in all circumstances, it contributes a general framework, 
model and illustrative descriptions to lead in that direction.  
 
I.  THEORY 
 
 A gatekeeping monitoring model can promote fair disclosure in securities 
transactions.  If those primarily responsible fail, a regulatory authority steps in.  In 
systems that interpose a secondary group of responsible parties between the primary party 
and the regulatory authority, misleading reporting can be prevented, not just punished.5  
True, secondary group failure will lead to punishing both primary and secondary actors.  
But fewer occasions requiring such punishment should arise.  As a result, it is customary 
in the literature to define as gatekeepers only the group of secondary private professional 
firms and to treat the regulatory apparatus as a further backstop rather than as a 
gatekeeper.6
 
A.  Conceptions  
 
 Several varieties of third-party assistance in accessing capital markets exist. The 
term “gatekeepers” designates professionals who enjoy some reputation for performing 
services that promote fair reporting and can deny capital market access to those not 
providing it.  Gatekeepers offer this service in exchange for contractual fees.  Their 
services are accompanied by legal duties that require them to act in certain ways or to 
                                                 
5 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. 
REV. 869, 883 (1990) (“A well-functioning gatekeeper regime is an elegant enforcement strategy. 
Wrongdoing is prevented, rather than punished after the fact, without the substantial administrative costs of 
a formal enforcement proceeding.”).  
 
6 See Peter Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 735 (2004) (observing and reviewing the common focus 
on private gatekeepers and then taking up the case of the SEC as a public gatekeeper). 
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provide certain forms of attestation.  Failure to do so puts at risk their reputations and 
exposes them to legal sanctions.   
 
 Whistleblowers, on the other hand, designate these and other participants who 
may identify mis-reporting, and contribute to correcting it, by reporting it internally 
within the enterprise or to official authorities. Whistleblowers may or may not have 
duties to do so and may be paid fees or bounties for doing so or simply win protection 
against retaliation.  In addition to this customary distinction between gatekeepers and 
whistleblowers, it is increasingly necessary to consider various hybrids that blend 
features of both traditional categories.  The following summarizes the main attributes of 
the alternative conceptions.  
 
 1. Gatekeepers — Gatekeepers work within the enterprise to correct mis-reporting 
before it occurs.  They are able to do so by threatening to withhold support that is 
necessary to complete a report or consummate a transaction.  Gatekeepers can deny 
access to capital markets.7  So gatekeepers are “intermediaries who provide verification 
and certification services to investors” by pledging their professional reputations8—and, 
by withholding such support, block admission through the gate.9   
 
 Law’s gatekeeper approach always imposes a monitoring duty but not necessarily 
a reporting duty: eventual discovery exposes the gatekeeper to liability for the primary 
violation, not merely a remedy for non-reporting.  Even so, the gatekeeper approach is 
intended to give professionals regulatory incentives to prevent mis-reporting.10  Most 
gatekeepers are paid for their services by the enterprises that retain them; all have stated 
duties whose breach exposes them to legal liability.  
 
 Gatekeepers thus include auditors and attorneys, who work directly with and 
essentially inside the enterprise.  Auditors attest to financial statement assertions under 
duties established by statute and articulated in professional codes of performance; 
lawyers advise on transaction design and disclosure, including whether senior executives 
can sign disclosure documents, and often provide written legal opinions or memoranda 
concerning legality and compliance.  Duties of both auditors and lawyers arise initially 
from contract but include a regulatory overlay of professional standards.  
                                                 
7 See Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in Corporate Legal 
Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213, 1247 (2000). 
 
8 John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 269, 279-280 (2004). 
 
9 This reconciles what otherwise appear to be two distinct definitional conceptions of gatekeepers that 
appear in the literature.  See Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of 
Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, n. 219 (2006) (identifying two strands of definition as those 
who: (a) certify as reputational intermediaries or (b) restrict access and endorse those admitted with their 
reputation for discretion); Oh, supra note ___, at 737 (noting conflation of reputational intermediary and 
professional capable of disrupting entry and exploring the distinction). 
 
10 Editors, Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2245 (2004). 
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 Gatekeepers also include other transaction participants, such as investment banks 
and sometimes rating agencies plus professionals working apart from transactions or 
outside the enterprise, such as securities analysts, and possibly stock exchanges and 
mutual funds. While auditors and lawyers essentially vouch for statements that the 
enterprise makes about itself subject to accompanying legal duties—financial statement 
assertions and narrative disclosure—the others generally offer separate statements of their 
own (a rating, a buy-sell recommendation and the like) without any equivalent duty. 
 
 Professionals within this broad conception of gatekeepers thus differ 
significantly.11  Roles vary with product or service type and the information its buyers 
and users receive.  In addition to the source of retention and inside or outside status and 
related duties, also varying are what professionals attest to or certify, such as fairness of 
financial statement assertions, legality of a securities issuance, quality of a debt 
instrument and so on.   
 
 Accordingly, also varying are all other public policy aspects of their respective 
performance, including requirements, expectations, capacities, incentives and appropriate 
legal liability for failure.  Indeed, auditors and attorneys reside at opposite ends of a 
gatekeeping spectrum: both put reputations and liability on the line but lawyers take 
leading roles in deal design and disclosure preparation while auditors take back-up roles 
in reviewing and testing disclosure.12  Despite these differences, the term gatekeeper has 
assumed customary usage, not only in the academic literature but in official regulatory 
pronouncements.13   
 
 2. Whistleblowers — Whistleblowers differ from gatekeepers, at least 
conceptually.  While gatekeepers generally work internally within enterprises to negotiate 
access to capital markets or deny it without further ado (keeping information 
confidential), whistleblowers report violations at the gate to the public or to authorities.  
When gatekeepers determine that they cannot exercise internal influence to correct 
statements that they believe require correcting, they may resign or otherwise withhold 
their services, but this does not also involve blowing any kind of whistle to any 
enforcement authority or to the public generally.14  The distinctive feature of the 
                                                 
11 See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note ___, at 306 & 346-64 (“all gatekeepers are not 
alike,” and developing proposals with entirely different content for auditors and for securities lawyers). 
 
12 Coffee, What Caused Enron, supra note ___, at 279-80. 
 
13 See Coffee, What Caused Enron, supra note ___, at n. 35 (citing, for example, Revision of the 
Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7870, 65 Fed. Reg. 
43,148, 43,150 (July 12, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240) (“the federal securities laws . . .  make 
independent auditors ‘gatekeepers’ to the public securities markets”)).  
 
14 See Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of 
Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1028 n. 30 (1993) (“While disaffirmance or resignation 
may have informational content in some cases, it is distinct from a pure whistleblowing obligation.”). 
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whistleblower approach, then, is that the third party discloses wrongdoing to authorities 
or third parties.15
 
 There are three recognized forms of whistleblowers.  The first is the volunteer 
whose interest in whistle-blowing is not based on any duty and does not lead to any 
reward.  The classic example is the enterprise employee who comes forward with 
evidence of wrongdoing and is protected under various statutes against retaliation and is 
entitled to compensatory damages arising from costs of pursuing this redress.  Notably, 
for employees, whistle-blowing doctrines usually provide job security, denying the 
enterprise’s temptations toward retaliatory discharge.   
 
 The second is the volunteer who shares in a bounty arising from blowing the 
whistle.  The classic general example outside the securities context are qui tam actions.  
In these, private parties are vested with authority to prosecute claims of violations of 
federal laws.  They share in the recovery on behalf of government.  The most prominent 
example is the False Claims Act.16  Analogous bounty schemes appear, including, in the 
securities law context, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s insider trading bounty 
program17 and, in the tax context, the Internal Revenue Service’s informant rewards 
system.18
 
 The third form of whistleblower is the non-volunteer, one with duties to come 
forward with public disclosure of discovered wrongdoing.  This type of whistleblower is 
also primarily a gatekeeper but has specific additional whistle blowing duties.  Consider 
auditors.  The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)19 expanded auditor 
whistle-blowing obligations, requiring the reporting of illegal acts within an enterprise 
and to the SEC if satisfactory responses are not forthcoming.20   Notably, few reports 
have been made under this provision.21   
                                                 
15  See Developments in the Law, supra note ___, at 2245. 
 
16 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006). 
 
17 17 C.F.R. 201 (2006); see also Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-1. 
 
18 See Internal Revenue Service, Pub. No. 733, Rewards for Information Provided by Individuals to the 
Internal Revenue Service (1997).  For analysis of these and several other federal bounty programs, see 
Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of 
Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141. 
 
19 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 758 codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4. 
 
20 See Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs, supra note ___, at 1246, n. 150. 
 
21 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 
1306 n. 39 (2003) (citing SEC reports).  Professor Coffee attributes this either to few actual problems or 
rationalized self-interest.  Another likely possibility is the chaperon thesis, in which auditors observing 
problems get them corrected so the client can be admitted, not bounced.  That is, they perform their 
gatekeeping function first.   
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 3. Hybrids —   Despite conceptual distinctions, the categories of gatekeeper and 
whistleblower do not exhaust the universe of possible designations.  Hybrids arise.  They 
can appeal for structural reasons.  For example, auditors who are discharged must provide 
disclosure about why.22  Auditor discharge invariably occurs because auditors believe 
that an enterprise is mis-reporting and they must blow the whistle publicly about that.  
The discharge is simultaneously an exercise of the gatekeeping function by refusing 
support and an exercise of whistle-blowing by reporting the reasons to the authorities. 
 
 Hybrids also can arise because of peculiar characteristics of particular 
professionals.  Consider lawyers.  Lawyers differ from auditors by having roles as 
advocate, deal designer and disclosure manager.  They also enjoy the attorney-client 
privilege designed to promote frank communications, although also bear duties to refrain 
from advancing fraud or criminality.  These special traits need not prevent performing 
gatekeeping or whistle-blowing functions, but they do lead to hybrid qualities.   
 
 Consider the rule addressing when lawyers report violations to the authorities 
(called “reporting out”).  Rules permit but do not require disclosing confidential 
information to prevent crime or fraud.23  Yet “true whistle-blowing strategies” require 
monitoring and reporting.24  The SEC separately proposed, but has not adopted, the so-
called “noisy withdrawal” alternative, which contemplates a lawyer announcing publicly 
its resignation based on perceived client violations.  This might increase lawyer 
incentives to serve as whistleblowers “by imposing a mandatory reporting duty in certain 
circumstances.”25  But even noisy withdrawal is not quite whistle-blowing, largely due to 
limitations arising from the attorney-client privilege.  That is, while it signals a red flag, it 
does not require that lawyers provide details.   
 
 Nor do the SEC’s rules as adopted embrace the gatekeeping model.  Under the 
rules, lawyers must report violations to designated internal officials within the enterprise 
(called “up-the-ladder reporting”) without necessarily reporting to outside authorities.  
But other elements of the gatekeeping model are missing: up-the-ladder reporting does 
not include the standard gatekeeping remedy of denying a client capital market access by 
withholding transactional support.   
 
 So lawyers do not enforce, but bear witness.  Enforcement is left to managers or 
directors in the reporting chain.  Again, the noisy withdrawal proposal would improve 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
22 Sec. & Exch. Comm., Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (Item 304); see Kostant, Breeding Better 
Watchdogs, supra note ___, at 1245-46. 
 
23 Developments in the Law, supra note ___, at 2245 (citing 17 C.F.R. 205.3(d)(2) (2003); Model Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b) (2004); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13(c)). 
 
24  Developments in the Law, supra note ___, at 2245-46.   
 
25 Id. at 2246. 
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this by requiring a lawyer, when internal reporting does not cure a violation, to end the 
retention and thus deny access through the gate.26  On the other hand, both existing and 
proposed rules impose liability for non-reporting, but not for the client’s primary 
violation as under the gatekeeping model.27
 
 B.  Conditions 
 
 Law’s whistle-blowing model is simpler than its gatekeeping model.  The former 
relies upon either payment or protection without venturing into the attributes of the 
relationship between the actor and the wrongdoer.  The gatekeeping model must not only 
design a relationship and specify duties, it must attend to the roles that reputation and 
liability play in its operation.  Thus numerous conditions must obtain for a gatekeeping 
model to succeed. 
 
 As a threshold matter, and in keeping with the metaphor, there must be a gate to 
keep, which an enterprise must traverse, and there can be no other way through it—at 
least some gatekeeper must tend the gate.  Likewise, the gate cannot be opened absent a 
keeper’s volition.  The imagery is intended to capture both enterprises seeking access to 
the public capital markets as an initial matter as well as existing public enterprises which 
effectively access those markets daily through obligations to provide disclosure on a 
periodic or transactional basis.   
 
 More fundamentally, the keeper must be able to influence the petitioner, to groom 
it for admission.  That is, the third party must be able to promote fair reporting.  That 
condition implies a universe of participants connected to initial, periodic or transactional 
reporting exercises.  Section 11 of the 1933 Act and Section 10 of the 1934 Act have long 
imposed duties and associated liability risks on such persons and private and SEC 
enforcement actions make the risk real.28  This approach can be justified by how these 
third parties enjoy low-cost access to information and thus can provide a “private 
monitoring service on behalf of the capital markets.”29
                                                 
26 Developments in the Law, supra note ___, at 2247. 
 
27  See Developments in the Law, supra note ___, at n. 133 (citations omitted); see also Peter C. Kostant, 
Sarbanes-Oxley and Changing the Norms of Corporate Lawyering, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541 (Section 
307 and the Part 205 Rules have flaws but  bode well to improve normative self-conception of securities 
lawyers to assume gatekeeper function); Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism, 
Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299  (Section 307 and the Part 205 
Rules give lawyers many ways to avoid reporting, so incentives have not changed much); Lisa H. 
Nicholson, SarbOx 307’s Impact on Subordinate In-House Counsel: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 
2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 559 (failure to distinguish and give special dispensation to low level in-house 
counsel is major defect in Part 205 Rules). 
 
28 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j; see also 15 
U.S.C. § 77(q)(a) (imposing on auditors the duties of inquiry and disclosure); 15 U.S.C. § 78r (creating 
private rights of action against persons, including accountants, who “make or cause to be made” materially 
misleading statements in reports or other documents filed with the SEC). 
 
29  See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 
857, 891 (1984) [hereinafter, Kraakman, Corporate Liability]; see also Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: 
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 Finally, the keepers must be independent and possess sufficient stakes in their 
reputations as keepers so that petitioner bribes cannot weaken their resolve at the gate.  
Legal theorists invariably emphasize that keepers can be effective when many petitioners 
seek entrance so that no admission fee (or bribe) can outweigh the expected costs of 
admitting the inadmissible.30    As Professor Coffee says, “At least in theory, a 
gatekeeper would not rationally sacrifice this reputational capital for a single client who 
accounts for only a small portion of its revenues.”31
 
 Thus the third party must be an “outsider” in the sense that it commands assets 
apart from the enterprise and its individual members pursue careers apart from the 
enterprise.32  This creates an incentive structure that differs from the enterprise and its 
employees.  As Professor Kraakman explained in his pioneering analysis, third parties 
usually “are likely to have less to gain and more to lose from [misleading reporting] than 
inside managers.”33  The stakes for these gatekeepers are influenced by both reputation 
and liability concerns, and their components can operate at the levels of individual actors, 
their firms and entire professions. Each is considered in turn. 
 
 1.  Reputation — Enterprises accessing capital markets can use two reputations to 
signal reliability: their own reputations for candor and that of their gatekeepers for 
thoroughness and veracity.  Enterprises seeking admission, initially or as an ongoing 
matter, develop or have their own reputations for the quality of their disclosure, on the 
range from fair to misleading reporting.  Candid enterprises enjoy more investor trust.34  
The more valuable a reputation is, the greater is the cost of jeopardizing it through 
opportunistic abuse of that trust.35  
  
 Third-parties can be hired to the same ends.  The enterprise can hire attorneys, 
auditors, underwriters, and rating agencies to provide reports backed by their own 
reputations for thoroughness and veracity.  Thorough and honest gatekeepers enjoy more 
                                                                                                                                                 
The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).  These two articles 
by Professor Kraakman are generally recognized as the seminal contributions to the theory of capital 
market gatekeeping. 
 
30 See Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 146 (2001). 
 
31 Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note ___, at 1269. 
 
32 Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note ___, at 891. 
 
33 Id., at 891. 
 
34 Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions are not Enough: The Significance of Opportunism, 
Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 223, 308-11. 
 
35 See id.   
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credibility, a valuable trait.  The more valuable it is, the greater is the risk of loss to their 
reputations so that, at some point, no additional incentives are even necessary.36   
 
 The more frequently firms are employed to serve as gatekeepers, and the larger 
the number of repeat occasions in which they expect to play it, the greater the value.37  
Enterprises pay fees for this credence.  Investors and other market participants appreciate 
these as valuable signals.38  When operating effectively, they contribute to a market in 
which securities prices tend to converge accurately towards the fundamental value of the 
related enterprise.39  
  
  Gatekeepers are by definition part of a profession, which boasts its own 
reputation.  This creates an externality—each firm exploits the profession’s reputation.40  
Investment in reputation benefits each firm but also the profession at large, so investment 
creates external benefits.  Others can free ride.  Both points reduce reputation investment 
incentives.  This problem is most severe in securities bucket shops but can also creep into 
the practices of both law and public accounting.  It operates at the macro (firm) level and 
micro (individual partner) level too. 
 
 Two strategies address this externality problem which, in turn, promote both the 
profession’s and each gatekeepers’ reputations. First, professional membership 
associations articulate professional codes of gatekeeper ethics or conduct.  These codes 
make clear, essentially, that admitting the inadmissible is simply wrong.  This is 
especially so for lawyers and accountants, whose professional identities are based upon 
such codes.  Lawyers thus serve gatekeeping functions in sifting out frivolous litigation 
claims and auditors do so when insisting that enterprises reclassify transactions or 
recalculate amounts.41
 
                                                 
36 See Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. LEG. STUD. 
295, 312 (1988) (reputations of auditors sufficient so third-party liability not necessary). 
 
37 See David Charney, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 375, 408-25 
(1990).   
 
38 Coffee, What Caused Enron, supra note ___, at 279-80 (2004) (the “market recognizes that the 
gatekeeper has less incentive to deceive than does its client and thus regards the gatekeeper’s assurance or 
evaluation as more credible than the client’s statements.”). 
 
39 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 
549, 618-21 (1984) (investment bankers’ good reputations promote efficient markets). 
 
40 Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 781, 787-88 (2001) [hereinafter Black, Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets].   
 
41 Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession, supra note ___;  see also Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent 
Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 595 (1993) (lawyers as gatekeepers in respect to contingent 
fees in criminal cases); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1992). 
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 Second, such associations or kindred organizations may provide specific licensing 
schemes that implicitly vouch for each gatekeeper.42  Examples are the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) for auditors and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) for securities firms, including underwriters.  In 
theory, these organizations police reputations of members and deny admission to 
unqualified applicants or expel non-compliant members.  Such threats may improve a 
profession’s return on investment in reputation by individuals and their firms.  They may 
be rooted in ethical or moral principles and they also perform an instrumental role in 
promoting a profession’s reputation.   
 
 While profession-driven reputation protection can be vital, in practice, the 
professions have not proven particularly good at this quest.43  This mixed success could 
be due, in part, to how the professions’ toolboxes contain sticks and not carrots. True, 
licenses are carrots when first issued, as a badge of professional honor,44 but the threat of 
revocation is more nearly a stick.  Enforcement steps lead to suspensions or expulsions. 
 
 Even so, the professional aspirations suggest the importance of culture in any 
analysis of reputation as a constraint on gatekeeper performance.  This entails an 
enormously complex set of factors that it is exceedingly difficult for law to micro-
manage (but not impossible for it to influence). Law can tinker with procedures and 
policies but these must be tailored to the peculiar attributes of a profession and in tune 
with idiosyncrasies of given firms and individuals.45
 
 To reflect briefly some of these complexities, there is some debate about exactly 
what kind of reputation various gatekeepers seek to maintain.  For auditors, it commonly 
is said that their reputation for honesty is their most valuable asset.46  But as a matter of 
practice for effective auditing, far more important is a reputation with management for 
toughness.47  For lawyers, there is some disagreement as to whether they seek to develop 
reputations with managers for complicity and empathy rather than with external investors 
for performing any kind of gatekeeping function.48  These complexities pose difficulties 
                                                 
42 Black, Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, supra note ___, at 788-89.   
 
43 See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775 (2006) (as to NASD 
and New York Stock Exchange). 
 
44 Black, Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, supra note ___, at 788-89.   
 
45 See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’ Responsibility 
for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 115 (1993) [hereinafter Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?]. 
 
46 E.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (“An accountant’s 
greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed closely by its reputation for careful work”), cert. denied 
498 U.S. 941 (1990). 
 
47 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure 
the Industry before it Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1726-27 (2006). 
 
48 See Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, supra note ___ at 101-11; McGowan, Why Not Try the 
Carrot?, supra note ___, at 1833-34. 
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for both the general theory of gatekeeping and the model of a carrot-based merit system 
discussed in Part III. 
 
 2. Liability — An extensive literature dissects the varying components and 
effectiveness of first-party versus third-party liability enforcement strategies.  First-party 
liability punishes the primary wrongdoer, and legal theory predicts a deterrent effect ex 
ante and a cost-internalization ex post.  Third-party liability supplements this device to 
address residual risks that the former fails to deter or so internalize.  It is justified when a 
third party is able to deter or coerce cost-internalization.  Law exploits this ability by 
imposing liability threats on gatekeepers based on primary violations of their clients. 
 
 Securities professionals have duties: approving transactions, designing or opining 
on them or related disclosure and providing assurance and attestation of financial 
statement assertions.  Failure in these duties triggers liability under various state and 
federal claims and a panoply of SEC administrative sanctions as well as criminal law.49   
In significant part, these doctrines are based on a theory of deterrence, a negative 
injunction to discourage misbehavior.50  Scholars endlessly debate and policy analysts 
endlessly tinker with the numerous intricacies of this framework to seek its optimal 
structure.  The following briefly highlights several examples. 
 
 At a general level, some believe that the liability risk need not be great and 
certainly nothing along the traditional US lines—a few high-damage lawsuits a decade is 
enough.51  For others, even less liability risk is necessary for lawyers, because they are 
naturally cautious by training, represent clients with liability risk on the line and protect 
their reputations by keeping their clients out of losing securities lawsuits.52  Yet others 
announce the benefits of increasing liability as if this is inevitable.  Thus: “Raising the 
penalties for both primary and third parties can be an effective way to make gatekeeping 
regimes work.”53  Professor Coffee states: “The more we suspect that attorneys will avert 
their gaze, the more we need to raise the penalties to deter them from so doing.”54     
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
49 See Puri, supra note ___, at 148-49 (reviewing all these liability risks). 
 
50 See Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671 (2002); see generally Gary S. Becker, Crime 
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1 
(GARY S. BECKER & WILLIAM M. LANDES EDS., 1974). 
 
51 Black, Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, supra note ___, at 794 (accountants) & 795 
(bankers). 
 
52  Id. at 795 & 800. 
 
53 Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs, supra note ___, at 1248, n. 159.   
 
54 Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note ___, at 1306.  
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 The shape of liability exposure can be altered, as by expanding the scope of duties 
or of doctrines such as broad interpretations of concepts like “substantial assistance” used 
to impose liability.55  Or due diligence duties could be specified expansively.  Third-party 
liability can be strict (as under the doctrine of respondeat superior) or duty-based (as 
under the doctrines of aiding-and-abetting or negligent non-detection).56   
 
 Some believe in the possibility of calibrating the duty to the penalties in optimal 
ways, as by a sliding scale on which, as liability standards move from negligence to strict, 
associated punishment for violations can be relaxed accordingly.57 Others contend that an 
optimal regime would allow gatekeepers to negotiate contracts with clients stating the 
levels of review and assurance to be provided, along with express terms of liability 
exposure tailored to that performance.58
 
 Scholars debate the method and effectiveness of alternatives means of 
enforcement.  They debate the scope of private rights of action under Section 10b or 
argue that stepped up public (SEC) enforcement is superior.59  In this quest, also relevant 
is the relative ability of enforcement authorities to learn of violations that warrant 
enforcement activity.60  Damages caps and safe harbors are likewise debated, along with 
the role of insurance.61  To conclude this non-exhaustive highlight of the many 
contestable parameters of system design, scholars debate the merits of enterprise versus 
individual liability.62
 
 Finally, some believe that the corollary of liability regulation works too. Consider 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines addressing corporate criminality.  While increasing 
                                                 
55 Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, supra note ___, at 115. 
 
56 Compare Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 491 (2001) with John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note ___. 
 
57 E.g., Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs, supra note ___, at 1248. 
 
58 See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. L. REV. 916 (1998). 
 
59 Compare Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: 
The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1994) and Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 727 (1995) with Joel Seligman, A Comment on Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying Private 
Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority,” 108 HARV. L. REV 438 
(1994). 
 
60 Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53 (2003) (framework for choosing strict 
versus duty- or knowledge-based liability according to how equipped enforcement authorities are to enforce 
violations—the less equipped, the greater the need for strict liability and vice versa—and locating auditor 
performance under the knowledge-based end). 
 
61 Compare Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open Market Securities Frauds, 38 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 641 (1996) with Harvey J. Goldschmid, Capping Securities Fraud Damages: An Unwise Proposal in 
an Imperfect World, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 665 (1996). 
 
62 See, e.g., Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note ___. 
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sanctions on the guilty, they also reduce sanctions for those who actively seek to deter, 
detect and disrupt.63  As Professor Kostant opines, “by greatly reducing the penalties for 
corporations that detect and disclose criminal activities, and requiring directors to 
cooperate in the prosecution of wrongdoers, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines offer a 
‘legal bribe’ to encourage gatekeeping.”64  These examples represent progress compared 
to the in terrorum approach of liability threats.  But they do not quite exhibit the 
attributes of a carrot-based merit system. 
 
 3.  Assessment — A regime of third-party liability provides some benefits as well 
as costs.  Benefits are the decreased incidence of mis-reporting by those otherwise 
inclined to mischief.  Mis-reporting is reduced either because (a) third parties arrest it on 
site, (b) insiders calculate the price of mis-reporting as higher than the benefits or (c) the 
fear of third parties catching them nips the inclination in the bud.65  Achieving these 
benefits requires a surgical attention to the perplexing challenges highlighted in the 
preceding section.  Costs are summarized in this one.    
 
 First, associated duties entail time, effort, training and other costs of precaution 
and implementation.  Even the best-laid execution will not prevent mis-reporting.  The 
fraud artists who pass through the gate undetected create additional costs in legal liability, 
borne either by the subject gatekeeper or by insurance.  Litigation and administration 
costs are considerable.  These costs include the costs associated with defending against 
non-meritorious claims.   
 
 Second, liability risk can overshoot the mark, at least in some contexts, and this 
may create excessive risk-aversion, which can mean too many vetogates.  It is a broad 
crude brush.66  Costs of a gatekeeper liability regime are the increased (and otherwise 
unnecessary) compliance burdens on those predisposed to report fairly.  A related cost of 
the regime is how third-parties, reflecting their own liability risk, will charge an 
associated premium or require over-investment in enterprise compliance and control 
infrastructure.  Related costs can be passed on to enterprises, which ultimately increases 
their cost of capital.  Smaller businesses are invariably hurt disproportionately.   
 
 Third, and given scant attention in the literature, liability risk may deter, but also 
can make gatekeepers unwilling to undertake functions that it would otherwise be 
desirable for them to perform.  For example, auditors always have resisted accepting any 
                                                 
63 Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs, supra note ___, at 1245, n. 146. 
 
64  Id. at n. 164 (citing Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note ___, at 70-71) (on using legal bribes to 
promote effective gatekeeping). 
 
65 However these benefits are achieved, Professor Kraakman’s chief insight is that “whenever potential 
offenders must employ incorruptible outsiders to gain legitimacy or expertise or to met [sic] a legal 
requirement, gatekeeper liability will thwart a class of offenses that are unreachable through enterprise-
level or managerial sanctions.”  Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note ___, at 891. 
 
66 See Choi, supra note ___.   
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undertaking to detect for fraud or opine on the reasonableness of management’s 
accounting choices.67  Lawyers likewise resist imposition of any obligations that even 
remotely threaten the jealously guarded attorney-client privilege and doctrines of 
confidentiality.68
 
 In any event, the calculus in a gatekeeper liability regime is never perfect.  It can 
be upset by contending business objectives over the short term.  This occurs especially 
when individual decision makers face a different reputation calculus compared to their 
employers.  It also occurs when enterprise personnel are able to pressure gatekeeping 
personnel into complacency or cooperation.  Behavioral biases in each context can distort 
further the individual applications of the calculus.  The fact that enterprises pay the 
gatekeeper’s fee exacerbates these limitations.    
 
II. FAILURE 
 
 Reputation and liability risk can be strong constraints in theory, but empirical 
evidence shows limitations on their success in practice.  Lawyers and auditors sometimes 
bend to client preferences despite their contrary better judgment.69  The recent era offered 
a laboratory of experience with the theoretical model which helps to illuminate its 
strengths, weaknesses, and how parts of the puzzle have been overlooked.  Numerous 
non-exclusive explanations appear for the observed limitations on the theory, most of 
which constitute particularized absences of the theory’s general requirements.  Some of 
these explanations apply equally to all gatekeepers, including lawyers and auditors, 
although others are specific to given professions.   
 
A.  Diminished Reputation Constraints 
 
 The third-party model requires incentives for gatekeepers to turn away the 
inadmissible (or whistleblowers to turn them in).  These incentives—at the levels of 
partners, firms and professions—may have been impaired by a series of factors limiting 
the power of reputational constraints during the late 1990s and early 2000s.   
 
 1. Partners — A common diagnosis of mis-aligned incentives considers the 
partner-level behavior of gatekeeper professionals.  It makes the conventional supposition 
that it is irrational for a large firm (such as Arthur Andersen LLP) to sacrifice its 
reputational capital for a single enterprise (such as Enron Corp.) but it may not be 
irrational for particular partners to do so.70  This occurs when individual partners have 
only one client, making their career depend on pleasing its management.   
                                                 
67 See Coffee, Gatekeepers, supra note ___; infra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
68 See McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot?, supra note ___. 
 
69  Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note ___, at 776. 
 
70 See Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and Auditors, 29 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 397, 412 (2004); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability of Professional Firms After Enron, 
29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 427, 447 (2004); Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, 
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 According to this line of thought, “debacles like Enron’s were inevitable in an 
environment that rewards audit partners who are captured by their client and punishes 
those who report negative information about their clients through the proper corporate 
channels.”71  This diagnosis underscores the value of rewarding those who report 
negative information, which would be a prominent attribute of a carrot-based merit 
system but is essentially non-existent in the current regime. 
 
 A related diagnosis emphasizes how a firm that allows its partners’ careers to 
depend on single clients commits colossal error, compounded when the firm relies solely 
on that partner—or a small coterie working with that partner—for information about the 
engagement.  Such a practice destroys the condition of independence necessary for 
effective gatekeeping.  Yet it occurred at Enron and perhaps on other engagements too.72  
At minimum, superior methods of internal assignment allocation are indicated.  The same 
or superior results could be achieved, moreover, by a carrot-based merit system. 
 
 In the case of lawyers, the one-client problem was less obvious, as most law firm 
partners specialize by subject matter not client, and provide the specialized service to a 
broad range of clients.73  On the other hand, some evidence from the period indicated a 
decline in this constraint for other reasons, chiefly when lawyers’ compensation was paid, 
in part, in equity in their client firms.74  This problem could impair the reputational 
constraint at the partner level by a desire to increase the value of that equity, either to 
increase personal or firm wealth. 
 
 2.  Firms — For a long time, the reputational constraint, backstopped by a modest 
threat of legal liability, satisfied the gatekeeper model’s requirements.75  But during the 
1990s, a major factor contributing to the reputational constraint changed, especially for 
audit firms.  Non-audit revenues soared in relation to audit revenue.76 By cross-selling 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 407-08 (2004); see also Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, 
Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 
48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1173 (2003). 
 
71 Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, supra note ___, at 407-08. 
 
72 Id. at 410. 
 
73 See Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note ___, at 1305-06 (noting that the one-client problem 
for audit partners can impair the reputational constraint at partner level but how this is not so at law firms).   
 
74 See Puri, supra note ___; see also John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer 
Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 481-85 (2002) (discussing 
traditional gatekeeper liability theory and noting controversy as to suitability of lawyers to perform the 
function); Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, Thief: Why Attorneys who Invest in their 
Clients in a Post-Enron World Are “Selling Out”, Not “Buying In,” 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (2005); Lisa H. 
Nicholson, A Hobson’s Choice for Securities Lawyers in the Post-Enron Environment:  Striking a Balance 
Between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and Market Gatekeeper, 16 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 91 (2002). 
 
75 See  Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, supra note ___, at 1350. 
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consulting services to audit clients, auditors had much to lose from severing clients or 
blowing the whistle on them.77  
 
 Apart from reducing incentives, this cross-selling essentially eliminated one of the 
most vital guarantors of auditor independence: the strong signal emitted when an auditor 
severs a client relationship.78  The signaling power of auditor firing of clients arises from 
how the enterprise must have an auditor while the auditor need not retain any given 
client.  Enterprises that are fired by their auditors thus lose much more than the auditor 
loses.  Indeed, they may be unable to find any auditor at all after being fired.  The auditor 
may even gain reputation value from this sternness, attracting new clients.79   
 
 Yet, during the 1990s, the incidence of auditor vetogating declined due to shifts in 
power from auditors to clients.80  According to this diagnosis, the existing auditing 
structure “will not function properly until a lead audit partner can confidently fire a 
dishonest client without jeopardizing his career.”81  In the period after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act became law, the number of audit firms firing clients increased dramatically.82   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
76 Prentice, Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note ___, at 786 (“consulting fees rose from seventeen 
percent of audit fees in 1990 to sixty-seven percent in 1999”) (citing Richard M. Frankel et al., The 
Relation Between Auditors’ Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings  Management, 77 ACCT. REV. 
(Supp.) 71, 89 (2002)); Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, supra note ___, at 1350 
(fees from audit clients for non-audit services rose from 13% of revenues in the 1970s to 50% of revenues 
in the 1990s). 
 
77 Professor Prentice documents factors that had the same weakening effect at all other gatekeepers, 
including lawyers, analysts, rating agencies, bankers, mutual funds and stock exchanges.  See Prentice, 
Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note ___, at 786-98. 
 
78 See Jeffrey N. Gordon What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business 
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1237 (2002) (most important guarantor of 
auditor independence is saliency of auditor terminations, a material event that must promptly be disclosed, 
but the value of which drops dramatically when audit firms cross-sell consulting services which give 
auditor incentives not to sever clients). 
 
79 The danger in this structure—also true of a merit system—is auditor strategic behavior, in which they fire 
entirely responsible clients to shine their image and attract other shinier clients.  See, e.g., Macey & Sale, 
Observations on the Role of Commodification, supra note ___, at 1176.  The effect, in any event, is a kind 
of balance of power between enterprises and auditors, one of “mutual reputation enhancement.”  Id. 
 
80 Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, supra note ___, at 409. 
 
81 Id. 
 
82 See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note ___, at 348, n. 148 (“In 2003, over 1460 public 
companies changed auditors, which was the highest number in at least five years. Although such switches 
could be because the client was dissatisfied with the auditor, many were because the auditor considered the 
client too risky—or because the auditor raised its fees in light of that increased risk. . . . By itself, this 
evidence may not prove that auditors are becoming significantly more selective with regard to clients, but it 
is at least consistent with such a hypothesis.”). 
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 On the other hand, auditors severed only smaller enterprises, even though all the 
frauds leading to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act involved large enterprises.  Moreover, not all 
non-audit services are banned, with a large exception for tax services to clients.83  This is 
both extremely lucrative and a context in which acute risk of illegality and fraud 
appear.84  Accordingly, while these reforms respond proportionately to a firm-level factor 
that reduced the reputational constraint’s power, more policy levers likely need plying, 
warranting consideration of a carrot-based merit system. 
 
 3.  Professions — Erosion of audit quality may have been due in part to auditing 
industry concentration.  Mergers during the 1990s reduced the number of large audit 
firms from eight to five and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen reduced it further to the 
current four.  These firms are massive compared to the next largest firms, with annual 
revenue at the four large firms reaching $20 billion compared to $1 billion for the next 
largest firms.  This concentration in the upper tier of the industry means that product 
differentiation is of little importance.85  With a large number of firms, competition can 
concentrate on product differentiation, including investment in reputation; but with so 
few firms, reduced competition diminishes incentives to invest in reputation and thus 
diminishes the power of the reputational constraint.86   
 
 A final—and pervasive—limitation on gatekeeping efficacy is how the enterprise 
pays the gatekeeper.87  That creates an inherent inclination for solicitude, simply to retain 
business.  Numerous solutions to this limitation have been proposed, some applied to 
                                                 
83 See Matthew J. Barrett, “Tax Services” as a Trojan Horse in the Auditor Independence Provisions of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463 (noting continuing auditor dependence on clients to whom 
they render tax services which are still allowed). 
 
84 See United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2004) (facts at preliminary stage of Internal 
Revenue Service and Department of Justice investigations into criminal conduct at KPMG, which 
eventually led to the firm’s narrowly escaping a criminal indictment); United States v. Stein, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 42915 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2006); see also Sheldon D. Pollack & Jay A. Soled, Tax 
Professionals Behaving Badly, 105 TAX NOTES 201, 210 (2004).  
 
85 See Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk among Big-Four Auditors, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 
(2006); Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical 
Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 297-98 
(2004)). 
 
86 Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What you Wish For: How Accountants and Congress Created the 
Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REV 741, 787-88 (2004); Prentice, Inevitability of a Strong 
SEC, supra note ___, at ___. 
 
87 Coffee, What Caused Enron?, supra note ___, at 279-80 (noting that gatekeeper utility is limited because 
paid by party to be monitored). 
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auditors and some to other intermediaries.  Examples include using insurance markets,88 
public funding,89 funding through stock exchanges90 or voucher financing programs.91   
 
 None of these has been adopted in the United States.  Instead, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act adopts a more cautious ground.  This reposes in an issuer’s board audit committee the 
authority to determine auditor compensation (and other auditor oversight, including 
retention and dismissal).92  One benefit of this approach is that audit committees can be 
conceptualized as gatekeepers, of a fashion, and there is some theoretical support for 
believing that having one gatekeeper pay another is an effective way to increase overall 
gatekeeping effectiveness.93
 
B. Reduced Liability Risk 
 
 Several legal changes during the 1990s reduced the exposure of secondary actors 
to legal liability for failure to promote fair reporting, including gatekeepers.  First, the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) changed the liability regime from 
joint-and-several liability to proportionate.94  Second, the Supreme Court held that the 
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws did not reach those who aid or abet 
others in mis-reporting.95  While this did not prevent SEC actions under that theory, it did 
significantly curtail those brought by private plaintiffs.96  Such changes reduced the legal 
                                                 
88 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to 
Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413 (2004) (instead of having companies pay auditors, authorizing 
them to buy insurance and having insurers hire and pay auditors). 
 
89 Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1, 29, n. 180 (suggesting but discounting possibility of having gatekeepers such as auditors paid through 
public funding). 
 
90 Larry E. Ribstein, SarbOx: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 289 (citing Paul M. Healy 
& Krishna G. Palepu, How the Quest for Efficiency Corroded the Market, HARV. BUS. REV., July 2003, at 
76 (having the stock exchanges coordinate and compensate auditors)).  
 
91 Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities 
Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269 (2003). 
 
92 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, codified in 15 U.S.C. § ___. 
 
93   COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note ___, at ___; see infra text accompanying notes ___-___ (one feature 
of the carrot-based merit system is the possibility of securities underwriters paying bonuses to auditors). 
 
94 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 758 codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.   
 
95 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994). 
 
96 See Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk, supra note ___ (the percentage of federal securities fraud class 
actions naming auditors as defendants decreased considerably since the Supreme Court announced that 
federal securities laws do not authorize private securities fraud actions against those aiding and abetting 
securities fraud). 
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liability threat, and this could have been a factor in declining propensity to protect 
reputations for integrity as gatekeepers (or whistleblowers).97  Certainly, when combined 
with the other factors noted above, incentives for quality gatekeeping declined.98  
 
 A related diagnostic concerning audit firms is based on changing forms of liability 
structures.99  Audit firms shifted from partnerships to limited liability entities.  This 
reduced incentives to maintain internal control.  Litigation risk fell.  So too did concern 
with steps that would reduce it.  At least in the case of Enron, this diagnosis concludes, 
“[i]t seems doubtful that this situation would have existed if the firm had been operating 
under a legal regime in which partners were jointly and severally liable for negligence, 
audits were tied to reputation and not sold as commodities, and auditors were truly 
independent.”100
 
 Much more could be said about the sources of litigation risk and how they change 
over time through doctrinal evolution or regulatory reform.  As the discussion of liability 
risk in the previous section attests, it is notoriously difficult to use alternative legal 
designs to achieve desired results.101  It is particularly perplexing to meet the specific 
objective of setting an optimal level of deterrence.102  Nevertheless, that discussion also 
shows how fair it is to say that the role of liability risk is a dominant feature of the 
scholarly literature—nearly an obsession.  Perhaps more litigation risk helps to reverse 
certain causes of gatekeeper failure.  But further discussion of that strategy in this review 
of the law will not advance that cause.  Indeed, the following discussion identifies 
systemic factors that contribute to reducing gatekeeper effectiveness, most of which are 
simply beyond the reach of any liability threats to control. 
 
C.  Systemic Factors 
 
 Cultural features of the gatekeeping landscape can influence its effectiveness.  
Two broad forces appeared to operate during the late 1990s when considerable 
limitations in the gatekeeper model appeared.   
                                                 
97 Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, supra note ___, at 1350 (noting that during the 
1990s, the legal liability threat to auditors declined and this, coupled with other factors, contributed to a 
greater willingness to risk the firms’ reputational capital). 
 
98 See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note ___, at 152-56; Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor 
Independence, supra note ___, at 470 (attributing source of audit gatekeeping deterioration to reduced 
liability risk, and concomitant decline in auditors’ traditional modes of independence and conservatism, 
plus the transformation of their consulting work into a high-return premium business carrying a suitably 
high risk for the auditor’s reputational capital). 
 
99  Macey & Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification,  supra note ___, at 1180. 
 
100 Id. at 1181. 
 
101 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___; see also John Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the 
Limits of Institutional Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929 (1988).  
 
102 See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note ___, at 61 (discussing the decline of deterrence). 
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 First, the era was characterized by financial euphoria.  A technological revolution 
occurred that altered means and methods of doing business and of many forms of human 
activity. In this and other such periods, a critical mass of persons throughout all sectors of 
society—including enterprises and investors and their professional advisors and 
gatekeepers—came to assume that a whole new era had emerged, for which the 
traditional norms of business and standards of accounting were less suited.103  It becomes 
easy in such periods to suspend critical judgment, including as to conventional matters of 
corporate governance and financial reporting.  Any gatekeeping model will suffer serious 
stress in such periods.104
 
 Second, a systemic emphasis on gatekeepers can backfire.  That is, gatekeepers 
stake reputations and liability only to the extent that there is at least a reasonable chance 
that mis-reporting will be uncovered in circumstances that damage reputation and create 
legal liability.   But, especially during a euphoric period, and when gatekeepers are the 
centerpiece of a regime’s integrity, professionals may believe that they can escape notice.  
If the system relies on gatekeepers to promote fair reporting, and gatekeepers know that, 
it is not irrational for gatekeepers to believe that they can conceal complicity.   
 
 For this reason, more elaborate gatekeeping theories emphasize using a multitude 
of gatekeepers as cross-checks, so that no one gatekeeper can assure permanent 
concealment.105  Alas, during a euphoric period, even the effectiveness of a well-thatched 
mass of cross-checking gatekeepers can be impaired. Collective suspension of objectivity 
can induce mutual myopia, as when auditors defer to lawyers who approve an approach 
to a reporting question while lawyers defer to the auditors who do so.106
 
 The bubble problem is recurring rather than continuing.  Other cultural factors of 
a more enduring nature can impair gatekeeper effectiveness. Critical to success is having 
individuals within professional firms capable of advancing and protecting the firm’s 
reputation.  This bonding is more likely in cultures where individuals enjoy and expect to 
have long-term relationships with a single firm.  In recent generations, however, cultural 
forces have led to far greater mobility among professionals, such as auditors and lawyers. 
They move from firm to firm more often than in previous generations.  This reduces the 
bonding between individuals and firms and related individual incentives to advance and 
protect firm reputations.107  
                                                 
103  Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might 
Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003). 
 
104  See Gerding, The Next Epidemic, supra note ___, at 426-28; Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor 
Independence, supra note ___, at 470. 
 
105 COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note ___. 
 
106 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting’s Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron’s Dark 
Shadows, 57 BUS. LAW. 1421 (2002). 
 
107  See Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession, supra note ___; see also Frederick W. Lambert, 
Preliminary Inquiry into the Transcendence of Value Creation, 74 OR. L. REV. 121 (1995). 
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 Bonding also was impaired when clients began more frequently to use numerous 
different firms for different kinds of services, as where an enterprise that once used a 
single outside law firm for nearly all its legal needs increasingly uses numerous different 
firms.108  That too breaks long-term bonds that concentrate on advancing and protecting 
reputations for candor and integrity in securities disclosure.  Likewise, more frequent 
mergers among professional service firms—a significant phenomenon among law 
firms—reduces the value of bonding.109
 
 Behavioral psychology contributes further partial but systemic explanations for 
why gatekeepers depart from the rationality-based assumptions of reputational constraints 
against misbehavior.  First, gatekeepers may succumb to biases and use heuristics that 
prevent exercising best judgment.110  Among numerous examples are the self-serving 
bias and the commitment bias, which can afflict auditors, lawyers and other 
gatekeepers.111 The first refers to a tendency to interpret data and assess uncertainty 
according to one’s own self-interest. The second refers to a tendency to continue to 
believe positions one already has taken, which can induce continued confidence in 
mistaken beliefs rather than update them in the face of new information.   
 
 Such biases can be addressed by structural devices.  As to auditors, for example, 
self-serving bias can be neutralized by reposing auditor supervision in audit committees 
and commitment bias by rotating audit partners through different auditing 
engagements.112  Harder to combat are more general behavioral biases known as 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
108 See Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note __ at n. 106 (citing Ronald C. Gilson & Robert H. 
Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalist: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and 
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specific capital which attracts clients and permits firm to serve as reputational intermediary on behalf of 
clients”)). 
 
109 See ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF PARTNER 
WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM BREAKUPS § 2.7.5, at 2:132 (2d ed. 2005 Supp.). 
 
110 Prentice, Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note ___, at 786 (citing Brian W. Mayhew et al., The 
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at 49, 66)). 
 
111 Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in 
Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 410 (1997) (evaluating lawyer motivations); 
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Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629 (1997); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-
Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 
VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977); Simon Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the Public Interest, and 
Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 423, 445-65 (1978). 
 
112 Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial 
Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 449, 485 (2001). 
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“backward recursion” and the “time delay trap.”113  These incline people to discount the 
significance of future events or circumstances, even those posing high magnitude 
consequences, and to value instant gratification at higher levels than equal measures of 
deferred gratification.  
 
 While all of the foregoing systemic factors contribute partial explanations for 
gatekeeper failure, associated analysis and reforms tend to revolve around the scholarly 
literature’s enduring focus on reputation constraints plus liability risk.114   These systemic 
factors are taken to explain why reputation assumes lesser importance in certain market 
environments.115  Reforms tend to focus either on reinvestment in reputations or 
enhanced litigation threats.  An important oversight in such a framework is how liability 
risk can induce gatekeepers to invest not in reputations for effectiveness but in campaigns 
to limit or eliminate the scope and type of their undertakings.   
 
 Examples of how increased litigation risk results in gatekeeper pushback include 
(a) for auditors, resisting any undertaking to opine on the reasonableness of accounting 
principles that management selects or to detect for fraud and (b) for lawyers, resisting any 
duty to conduct due diligence or to opine on disclosure integrity to constituents other than 
a client’s board of directors (or, in some circumstances, a securities underwriter).116  In 
each case, a Catch 22 appears: without litigation risk, gatekeepers acquiesce but with it, 
they want limited responsibilities.  While a system reliant on reputation and litigation risk 
cannot unwind this conundrum, adding a carrot-based merit component to the system 
might help.  
 
III.   CARROTS 
 
 Missing from the prevailing analysis in the literature on gatekeepers are values of 
awards that might be paid for activating vetogates—bonus payments to the gatekeeper 
who denies admission to the inadmissible.  Professor Kraakman’s original formulation 
identifies effective gatekeepers as those with incentives that differ from clients in that 
they have “less to gain and more to lose” from granting capital market access to clients 
who mis-report.117
                                                 
113 See Prentice Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note ___; infra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
114 See, e.g., COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note ___, at 5 (“both strategies (i.e., both legal remedies and 
reputational intermediaries” are important) (emphasis added); see also id. at 318 (“gatekeeper’s willingness 
to resist pressure [from managers] will still depend on” litigation risk and reputation loss).   
. 
115 See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note ___, at 67 & 318-324. 
 
116 Increased litigation risk also emboldens gatekeepers to lobby for other kinds of reforms, including, most 
commonly, calls to cap liability for damages arising from their violations of law.  See Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, The Thick Backstop for Auditor Liability: Analytical Skepticism about Damages Caps 
(unpublished draft manuscript on file with the author) (March 2007); supra note ___ (citing debate between 
Professors Langevoort and Goldschmid on the merits of such efforts). 
 
 
117 Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note ___, at 891 (emphasis added). 
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 What gatekeepers have to gain is the value of the bribe and what they have to lose 
are reputation (and its instrumental value) and liability costs.  Neglected in this and 
kindred formulations is what gatekeepers have to gain from turning the petitioner away—
true, they have to gain a good reputation with instrumental value.  But just as the one side 
of the equation emphasizes “more to lose” in both reputation impairment and legal 
liability and the other side emphasizes “less to gain” from complicity, the equation 
should also emphasize “more to gain” from vetogating—bonuses in a carrot-based merit 
system of gatekeeping.  
 
 The following discusses carrots for vetogates from several perspectives.  
Discussion first provides an intuitive basis for the inquiry, followed by a formal and 
general model employing both rational and behavioral assumptions.  Discussion then 
investigates how a system can be constructed from that model, first for lawyers and then 
for auditors.  This investigation considers the services for which awards could be paid, 
potential sources of funds to pay them and contractual and other devices to implement the 
concept.  
 
A.  A General Model 
 
 This section outlines a general model of a carrot-based merit system.  It begins 
with an account of the intuition, followed by a rational economic actor model and some 
perspectives from behavioral economics. 
 
 1. Intuition — Popular corporate governance strategies include incentives 
designed to align principal-agent interests.  These are intended to supplement primary 
tools such as shareholder election and removal of directors and shareholder voting on 
extraordinary transactions.  The most conspicuous of these popular strategies are the 
executive compensation packages that are tied to corporate performance.  Stock options 
are the commonest form of these incentive systems.  They epitomize the intuition behind 
any merit system: stock options give managers incentives to increase stock price.  How 
effective these devices are is debated, however, with some critics asserting that they 
overreach by tempting managers to provide misleading reporting to inflate stock price 
artificially.118  
  
                                                                                                                                                
 Yet the intuition remains strong.  It is an exquisite instance of giving agents 
(managers) incentives to promote an alignment of their interests with principals 
(shareholders).  The insight can be adapted correspondingly for gatekeepers.  They can be 
 
 
118 See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); WARREN E. BUFFETT & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE 
ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT: LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA 54-61 (2nd ed. 2001); see also John 
Cassidy, How the Financial System Encouraged Corporations to Go Crazy, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 23, 
2002);  but see William W. Bratton, Jr., The Academic Tournament over Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. 
L. REV. 1557 (2005); Stephen Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides, 83 TEX. L. REV. 615 
(2005). 
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given incentive compensation that is contingent upon achieving designated results, 
namely, discovering and correcting mis-reporting.  Indeed, if the benefits of stock options 
are real, as devotees contend, similar benefits should accrue from awarding analogous 
options to gatekeepers.  Moreover, if the deleterious effects of stock options are real, as 
critics claim, an ideal response is to offer countervailing incentives to gatekeepers to 
neutralize those effects.  That is, to the extent that risk of misleading reporting increases 
in tandem with stock-based compensation, a precise antidote is merit-based gatekeeping 
to offset that increase. 
 
 The intuition is akin to a hypothetical model of incentive compensation that 
Warren Buffett offered concerning investment banking services.  In a symposium panel 
discussing how boards of directors assess mergers, Mr. Buffett considered the role that 
board advisors play in pursuing mergers, especially the role of investment bankers.  
Many investment bankers charge contingent fees for merger transactions, giving them 
strong incentives to close a transaction even if not in the client’s best interest. 
 
 To correct for this perversion, Mr. Buffett quipped as follows: “If I’m going to 
pay $5 million to somebody if they give me the advice and the deal goes through, then I 
think I probably ought to pay $5 million to somebody else whose advice I listen to who 
gets paid the $5 million only if the deal doesn’t go through.”119  Similarly, if shareholders 
pay senior executives incentive compensation to achieve designated corporate 
performance measures, then they should be willing to pay gatekeepers incentive 
compensation to assure that achieving them is done using fair reporting.   
 
 This intuition can be amplified by insights that Professor Painter contributed 
concerning retaining law firms in merger transactions.120  They too have been known to 
use contingent compensation arrangements, sometimes with disastrous consequences for 
shareholders of their clients.  Professor Painter instances a $35 million contingent fee that 
Time-Warner Co. paid to a law firm upon the closing of its merger with America-On-
Line (AOL).  The price Time-Warner paid for AOL in that merger was exorbitant and 
wound up costing its shareholders some $200 billion in investment value.121  As with Mr. 
Buffett’s quip about investment bankers, Time-Warner shareholders would likely have 
benefited if the company paid one law firm $35 million if the deal closed and another 
firm $35 million if it did not.    
 
 This example furnishes additional intuitive support for a carrot-based merit 
system for gatekeepers, including lawyers.  That is, it may promote effective gatekeeping 
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for enterprises to employ or otherwise take advantage of two teams of lawyers rather than 
rely upon one.  Moreover, to correct this problem, Professor Painter advocated banning 
lawyer contingent fees in corporate transactions. This sensible proposal is akin to existing 
bans against auditors from charging clients contingent fees.122  The rationale, of course, 
is to impair managerial power to bribe gatekeepers into complicity.  
 
 A further step appears, however, that could strengthen gatekeeper effectiveness.  
It would provide for contingent fees for auditors (or lawyers) who discover and correct 
mis-reporting under circumstances when they otherwise had no legal obligation to do so.   
This would not require amending the current ban on auditors charging contingent fees or 
interfere with imposing one on transactional lawyers.123 Fees still would be charged. 
Additional fees would be payable upon discovery of errors or irregularities not otherwise 
within the existing responsibilities of gatekeepers to uncover or report upon.124   
 
 A merit system’s intuitive appeal also shows in how it can respond to some of the 
diagnoses of gatekeeper failure noted earlier in this Article.  First, it generally is agreed 
that the scale of consulting services enabled managers to pressure auditors into 
acquiescence.125  Firing an auditor for being a tough auditor is a red flag to the market 
but firing an auditor from its non-audit services is not.  Managers thus offered a carrot 
while holding out a stick as well:  a favorable audit in exchange for lucrative consulting 
assignments.  Auditors in the consulting business may have offered favorably lax audits 
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to generate more assignments.126  As Professor Coffee says, “the carrot works better than 
the stick, precisely because the threat to take the carrot away [can be] more credible.”127  
 
 This insight suggests inverting the policy experience.  If auditors paid bonuses to 
do consulting work became more lax on audits, then paying them bonuses for fraud 
detection and discovery should improve audit effectiveness.  That is, during the 1990s, 
firms adopted the business model that rewarded audit partners for generating consulting 
work.  It should now be attractive to let firms adopt the business model that rewards audit 
partners for generating fraud-detection work. This would provide additional 
compensation for success in performing a watchdog function (whether the compensation 
is called “bribes,” “carrots,” or “contingent fees”) in addition to the existing regime that 
imposes liability risks (whether those risks are called “threats,” “sticks” or “deterrence 
penalties”). 
 
 Second, a common diagnosis of the reputational constraint failure is how a firm’s 
and a partner’s incentives may differ.128  Professor Coffee responds that, while plausible, 
this diagnosis is incomplete.  If a firm really sought to protect its reputation, then it would 
control those persons through mandatory rotation of assignments or by imposing caps on 
non-audit revenue they could earn.129  This response, which seems correct, also 
contributes to the intuitive case for a carrot-based merit system.  If firms wished to pursue 
the ends as Professor Coffee hypothesizes, then an internal merit system, such as 
awarding points or compensation for fraud detection, should be attractive. 
 
 Third,  the standard conception of auditor reputation emphasizes investor 
assessment of auditor integrity—a conception that applies equally to other gatekeepers.130  
So viewed, carrots play no obvious role—integrity reflects a “disclose if detected” 
approach.  But if one emphasizes an auditor’s or other gatekeeper’s reputation with 
management for toughness, carrots become more obvious tools.  Given the inherent limits 
that auditors and other gatekeepers face in testing the veracity of managerial assertions, 
reducing mis-reporting requires managers to believe that auditors and other gatekeepers 
are ruthless.  That reputation can be enhanced by rewarding auditors and others for 
successful detection and correction of mis-reporting. 
 
 Finally, some believe that lawyers who were paid in equity securities of clients 
may have suffered impaired judgment as a result.131  This can be akin to the downside of 
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compensating managers using stock options.  While both tools can tend to align the 
interests of the gatekeepers/agents with those of the principal, they also can overreach 
and induce both gatekeepers and agents to acquiesce in or promote mis-reporting.  This 
likewise suggests inverting the experience.  Instead of compensating lawyers in client 
equity securities, a carrot-based merit system would compensate them, in part, with 
contingent bonuses for discovering mis-reporting.  
 
 2.  Rational Economics — A basic formal model of gatekeeper decision-making 
compares the gains from acquiescence to the expected costs of inculpation.  The carrot 
system adds gains from vetogating to the calculus, which must be sufficient to tip the 
balance for both firms and individuals.  The following discussion presents a general 
model of this calculus.  Its deliberate generality is intended to enable the model to be 
tailored to address specific attributes of differing situations.  For example, specifications 
of the model would address variations arising from the kind of professional involved 
(e.g., auditor or lawyer), the characteristics of its role (as gatekeeper, whistleblower or 
hybrid) and the bearing that reputational constraints have on discharging those functions.  
 
 A similarly generalized fact pattern offers a good starting point for introducing the 
general model.  In connection with a pending transaction, a corporate employee (worker, 
manager or director) commits fraud (say booking false revenues or wrongly classifying 
an expense as an asset).  Gatekeepers participate in generating the related documentation 
(which investment bankers draft, auditors certify and lawyers conform in disclosure 
documents).  The gatekeepers have duties in respect of the transaction and also 
opportunities apart from those duties to become aware of the fraud.  For each, 
gatekeepers must decide whether to perform their duties (and, if they discover anything, 
to correct, disclose or withdraw) and whether to perform additional tasks, not otherwise 
required, that may uncover it (and then face the same set of alternative decisions).   
 
 In each case, a complex set of costs and benefits appear.  Benefits of complicity at 
each step include fees from the pending transaction, the present value of probable future 
fees from other transactions and any slice of the fraud such as bribes to acquiesce; costs 
of complicity include the discounted probability of inculpation.  Following most 
gatekeeper theory, the gatekeepers wish to preserve and promote a reputation for veracity 
and thoroughness and thus see complicity as posing a potential cost in reputation.  In 
some cases, the gatekeeper may prefer a reputation for complicity and thus make the 
opposite calculation.132  Setting those latter cases aside for the moment, the following 
formulation captures the decision’s principal elements:133
                                                 
132 It is possible for reputation effects of effective gatekeeping to be a negative.  See McGowan, Why Not 
Try the Carrot?, supra note 1, at 1828 (contending that reputation effects of effective gatekeeping by 
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gatekeepers.  It runs counter to the basic theory of gatekeeping.  Professor McGowan assumes that clients 
dislike whistle-blowing lawyers because it increases transaction costs.  While acknowledging the 
possibility that such action benefits clients by signaling to third parties a trustworthy client, Professor 
McGowan believes that if this were so, one would observe more whistle-blowing than we actually observe.  
But this hypothesis seems to overlook how whistle-blowing is an ex post action whereas gatekeeping is an 
ex ante action.  From this distinction, one might infer from relatively low levels of observed whistle-
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B < > P[d] * { ( P[e] * L[l] )  +  L[r] } 
 
where: 
 
B      = benefits from mis-reporting 
P[d] = probability of detection 
P[e] = probability of enforcement 
L[1] = legal liability  
L[r] =  reputation damage. 
 
 This formulation expresses the relationship between the benefits of complicity on 
the left hand and the costs of inculpation on the right.  It captures how rational actors will 
facilitate mis-reporting when the benefits, B, exceed expected total costs.  In turn, 
expected total costs depend initially on the probability of detection, P[d].  Assuming 
detection occurs,  then expected legal liability is the product of the probability of the laws 
being successfully enforced, P[e], and associated legal liability if so, L[1].  Expected 
total costs add reputation damage, L[r], to that result.   
 
 Recall how assessments in the scholarly literature, including diagnoses of the 
Enron era, highlight mis-aligned incentives and under-deterrence from inadequate 
liability risk.134  The foregoing model captures these, respectively, in the magnitude of 
the benefits, B, and the magnitude of legal liability, L[1].  The mis-aligned incentives 
thesis as applied to gatekeepers supposes that B was too high compared to L[r] and the 
legal liability thesis supposes that L[1] was too low compared to the optimal level. 
 
 Recall also how, in the scholarly literature, little or nothing is said about carrots—
that is, incentive compensation from activating a vetogate.  The literature concentrates 
almost entirely on the mis-aligned incentives and legal liability theses.  If carrots were 
added, the gatekeeper’s decision would include weighing the gains that she would earn 
from vetogating.  In the formula, this would mean adding a new variable to the right side 
of the equation, as follows:  
 
B < > P[d] * {(P[e] * L[l]) + L[r]} + G 
 
where 
 
G = gains from payments received under a carrot-based merit system for disrupting mis-
reporting (vetogating). 
                                                                                                                                                 
blowing that high levels of effective gatekeeping exist.  Compare supra note ___ (mentioning the chaperon 
thesis of gatekeeping in relation to whistle-blowing). 
 
133  Gerding, The Next Epidemic, supra note ___, at 426-28. 
 
134 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
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 For convenience, in the ensuing discussion, the components of this expanded 
equation will be referred to as follows: G for these newly-added gains, B for the benefits 
of complicity and C for the total expected costs of inculpation [P[d] * {(P[e] * L[l]) + 
L[r]}].   
 
 In pursuing the optimal level of G, it must be sufficient so that B < C + G.  In 
other terms, G must equal or exceed B – C.  The necessary amount of G will vary with 
particular attributes of different professions, functions, environments and so on.  But to 
offer a sense of the likely parameters, it should be possible to hazard reasonable 
theoretical approximations of both a minimum level and a maximum level.  While these 
approximations may be made using a number of different tools, consider one example of 
each.  The minimum required level of G might be approximated by reference to a 
deciding agent’s opportunity cost—a portion of B. A maximum level can be 
approximated by reference to the next best deterrence strategy.  Consider each in turn, 
appreciating that these are analytical and illustrative rather than scientific or definitive. 
 
 As to approximating the minimum G, firms should compensate members to 
motivate them to build the firm’s long-term reputation but, for firms, retention requires 
meeting employee opportunity costs.135  A professional’s opportunity costs—gains 
available from the next best option—are determined in large measure by the managers 
with whom she regularly interacts, meaning clients, whose assessments of a 
professional’s reputation is significant (for example, they will be asked to provide 
references should the professional subsequently apply for new employment).  This can 
put her allegiances with those persons, not with her firm.  This increases the difficulties 
that the firm has in monitoring its clients.  To neutralize this difficulty, a minimum G 
would be that amount necessary to bond the professional’s interests to that of the firm’s 
long-term reputation.  In this approximation, that is the amount of those opportunity 
costs. 
 
 As to approximating the maximum G, it must be no greater than the next best 
alternative strategy (if it were greater, then the alternative would be superior). For 
illustration, among candidates for the next best deterrence strategy is a legal regime that 
imposes vicarious personal liability on partners of the deciding actor’s firm.  Partner X 
would be held liable for violations committed by Partner Y.  This would increase the 
incentives that Partner X has to monitor Partner Y.  But as Professor Ribstein explains, 
“this liability may be ineffective because it places risk on those who are ill-situated to 
prevent harm.”136  Thus, such a system of negative threats may create excessive 
incentives for internal monitoring and yet remain ineffective.   
 
                                                 
135 Larry E. Ribstein, SarbOx: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 288-289.   
 
136 Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability of Professional Firms After Enron, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 427, 447 
(2004). 
 
 33
 As a next-best strategy, however, the alternative can be used to approximate a 
maximum level of G necessary to support a merit system.  With a merit system, Partner Y 
earns rewards that reduce the need for Partner X to monitor Partner Y. Rather than 
impose vicarious liability on Partner X for “wrongs” of Partner Y, a merit system awards 
Partner Y bonuses for “rights” that reduce Partner X’s need to monitor Partner Y.  The 
maximum G, then, would be the cost to Partner X of engaging in such oversight (if G 
were more than that, the vicarious deterrence alternative would be superior).137
 
 Obviously, other avenues for estimating the parameters or ranges of G are 
possible and I provide these to suggest the model’s feasibility rather than to delineate it 
completely.  In the same vein, it may be useful to consider additional alternatives to the 
existing gatekeeper regime with its emphasis on sticks.  Consider, for example, the 
extreme alternative of eliminating using private gatekeeping altogether.  This is extreme 
because it removes other benefits of the private gatekeeping model, which is far less 
intrusive than would be an SEC or other purely public model.138  Even so, some critics 
lament that limitations on the reputational constraint—manifested by the discrete and 
cumulative failures of private gatekeeping—warrant displacing it altogether in favor of 
an emboldened public enforcement program through a strengthened SEC.139   
 
 In this critique, reputation is insufficient when partners (even rational ones) focus 
on short-term personal gain rather than long-term firm reputation.140  Apart from whether 
the limitations justify such a revolutionary move, a more incremental step yet untried 
would look to carrots to increase gatekeeper effectiveness. Under this view, the 
misaligned incentives critique of the reputation constraint can best be met by using 
carrots to counterbalance this effect by offering short-term personal gain not to be in on 
the fraud.  That is, adding G to the model is superior to increasing C through regulatory 
empowerment.  
 
 Another alternative would manipulate the costs of inculpation (the level of C) 
using devices other than cash.  For example, Professor McGowan proposed that securities 
lawyers who are first to exercise a vetogate against a mis-reporting enterprise be 
rewarded with transactional immunity from any related prosecution.141  This is a valuable 
contribution to the literature, exploring as it does the potential utility of adding carrots to 
the existing regime.  Possibly due its novelty, however, it is a narrow and modest change: 
it applies only to lawyers for a limited whistle-blowing function and provides the carrot 
                                                 
137 Again, these are approximations of parameters, intended to support a view of the model as reasonable, 
not scientific determinations. 
 
138 Cf. supra note ___ (noting how regulators are not generally seen as gatekeepers). 
 
139 See Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note ___, at ___. 
 
140  Id. at 798. 
 
141 McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot?, supra note 1, at ___ (proposing transactional immunity to the first 
securities lawyer to blow the whistle on an unlawful transaction). 
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of lenity (which may be more accurately perceived as a lighter stick than a carrot).  This 
Article is offering a broader model for use by all gatekeepers and contemplates paying 
cash (and providing other forms of public recognition as noted in the next section).  
 
 This Article accordingly operates at a higher level of generality and, as noted, this 
means that the foregoing general model requires specification for particular applications.  
First, it requires specification according to the professional identify of different 
gatekeepers.  What works for auditors may not work for lawyers.  The leading example 
would be how to interpret the reputational constraint.  For auditors, all seem agreed, that 
reputation value is increased by enforcement and compelling disclosure whereas, for 
lawyers, scholars debate whether a reputation for complicity is more valuable than one 
for probity.142  In the foregoing model, this difference between auditors and lawyers 
concerns whether to locate reputation, [r], on the left or right side of the equation.  While 
[r]’s location influences G’s requisite level, G remains a useful addition to the decision 
calculus under either assumption. 
 
 Second, the model requires specification for variations among gatekeepers, 
whistleblowers and hybrid species.  As traditionally defined, gatekeepers are present to 
prevent access to capital markets or to correct a problem before a party is granted access.  
They bear duties to do so and may be more often exposed to bribes for complicity.  
Whistleblowers traditionally report after a violation has occurred and a party has passed 
through the gate (has accessed the capital markets).  Setting hybrid models aside, whistle-
blowers often do not have duties to report and those engaged in mis-reporting may be less 
conscious of the value of offering bribes to them.  Accordingly, this means that the 
comparative benefits of complicity and costs of inculpation vary as between gatekeepers 
and whistleblowers (or hybrids).  Again, these differences do not alter the basic 
relationships between benefits and costs in the general model but would require 
specification for particular applications. 
 
 3.  Behaviorism — Carrots can supplement not only the foregoing rational 
economic actor model but also address criticisms of gatekeeping that arise from 
behavioral economics.  Professor Prentice identifies two major behavioral limitations on 
the reputational constraint, both of which can be neutralized using a carrot-based merit 
system.143  First, consider backward recursion.144  This means future benefits of honesty 
are dwarfed by short-term returns from dishonesty.  This problem can be especially acute 
in certain settings, including end-game contexts (say, a person near retirement or a firm 
near dissolution), internal principal-agent contexts (where a firm’s reputation counts but 
                                                 
142 See supra note ___; see also supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
143 See Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding 
Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1427, 1429-34 (2002) (critique of reputational constraint 
based on six countervailing factors).  I cannot address all the behavioral factors, of which there are 
potentially hundreds or thousands.  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor 
Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2002). 
 
144 Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note ___, at 798, n. 142. 
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an individual member gets little benefit from it) or when gains to individuals exceed 
probable future losses or through mis-estimation of any of these and related penalties.   
 
 Again, while a carrot-based merit system may not eliminate these biases—
especially the risk of mis-estimation—it would contribute to counteracting them.145  It 
does so by increasing the short-term returns from honesty.  It can surgically respond to 
the settings in which risk of backward recursion is particularly acute.  For end-game 
settings, it increases retirement resources and firm solvency; it also closes the reputation 
gap that arises from mis-aligned incentives.  If G is sufficiently large relative to the 
difference between B and C, it can even reduce the risk of mis-estimation.  
 
 Second, gatekeepers may suffer from a time delay trap.146  This refers to how 
reputations take years to build, delaying gratification, but people often over-value instant 
gratification147 and under-appreciate long-term effects.148  This condition manifests in 
improper activities promising immediate payoffs if they are either unlikely to be detected 
in the long-term or if the long-term is sufficiently distant to be discounted into 
immateriality.  Self-serving bias can exacerbate this condition when people assess 
information supporting self-interest, including, in fraud-tempting contexts, rationalizing 
schemes.  Liability risks are long-term and can be discounted; overlooking evidence of 
bad news enables being in on the scheme.  A carrot system likewise counteracts all these 
biases: dollars paid today both offset the discounting effect and compensate gatekeepers 
for not being in on the scheme. 
 
 Professor Painter notes that regulations have done little to address cognitive 
biases.149  As examples, commitment bias can induce auditors to hide post-reporting 
discoveries or induce lawyers to adhere to previous assessments of the probability of 
litigation outcomes despite new information tending to contradict the assessment.150  The 
resulting biased judgments can infect related disclosure. Among possible regulatory 
solutions to such problems are to use audit committees as auditor supervisors, as required 
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or to obtain a second lawyers’ opinion (an option but not a 
                                                 
145 True, the biases may complicate estimating the optimal G, but that is likewise true of estimating the 
other components of the rational economic actor model. 
 
146 Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note ___, at 798, n. 148; see also Manuel A. Utset, 
Model of Time-Inconsistent Misconduct: The Case of Lawyer Misconduct, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 
(2005). 
 
147 Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note ___, at 798, n. 149. 
 
148  Id. at 798, n. 148. 
 
149 Painter, Convergence and Competition, supra note ___, at 415. 
 
150  Id. at 414. 
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regulatory requirement).  Neither solution is perfect or complete—adding a carrot-based 
merit system can reduce the imperfections, if not complete the policy puzzle.151   
 
B.  Private Arrangements 
 
 If the foregoing intuition and formal general model are potentially appealing 
conceptually, it remains to consider practical steps necessary to implement the system.  
The following exploratory discussion considers private arrangements, for lawyers and 
auditors, considering the services that an incentive system might encompass and 
sketching some of the parameters of how private contractual arrangements can be 
designed to fund and implement them. 
 
 1.  Services — A carrot-based merit system concentrates on functions that 
gatekeepers are not otherwise required by law to perform but that, in certain 
circumstances, it would be productive to have them perform.  This category can be large 
and exists, in part, because of gatekeepers’ reluctance to accept categorical exposure to 
liability for undertaking the associated functions.  Contract is a better approach since it is 
more clearly voluntary and enables tailoring to particular circumstances.  The following 
illustrates some of the kinds of services that could be encompassed within a carrot-based 
merit system.  It classifies them for convenience into two categories, called investigation 
and certification.  Examples of each are provided for both lawyers and auditors.  
 
 For lawyers, a good illustration of the investigation category concerns due 
diligence exercises.  Lawyers are permitted but not required to perform due diligence in 
respect of parties in numerous capital market transactions, from underwritten public 
offerings to change of control arrangements (when the party is their client or an opposing 
side).  Lawyers generally perform due diligence but performance creates a defense 
against securities law liability.  The failure to perform, or the failure to discover problems 
and block the gate, does not, ipso facto, expose lawyers to liability.  However, lawyers 
are component to do so, of course, as they undertake such functions when retained for 
special purposes, as where an enterprise detects for specific misconduct that has come to 
its board of director’s attention.152   
 
 For auditors, a good illustration of the investigation category concerns the context 
of fraud detection.  Auditors conduct full-scale audits of clients but are not strictly 
                                                 
151 It is foolish to conjecture how a carrot-based merit system would influence collective behavior during a 
market bubble such as that fueled by technological change during the late 1990s and 2000s.  See supra text 
accompanying notes ___-___.  Given how episodes of financial euphoria recur in history, it seems doubtful 
that any system design feature can mediate them (yet regulatory change in response to fallouts from 
financial euphoria likewise recurs).  See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77 (2003). 
 
152  See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett., 393 N.E. 994 (N.Y. 1979) (audit committee of General Telephone & 
Electronics Corp.’s board of directors retained the Washington, D.C. law firm of Wilmer, Cutler & 
Pickering to conduct internal investigation growing out of the foreign bribery scandals of the 1970s); see 
generally Arthur F. Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 655, 666-678 (1984) 
(providing numerous illustrations of the practice and its origins as well as assessing benefits and costs).   
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obligated in doing so to detect for fraud.  This means that their failure to discover fraud 
does not, in itself, expose them to legal liability.  Professional auditing standards do 
articulate a modest measure of obligation to detect for fraud but its exact scope as a 
matter of law is contested and uncertain.153  As a result, its execution in practice is 
limited rather than expansive.  Auditors prefer to deny having any duties that would flow 
from a broad interpretation of the standard.154   
 
 Nevertheless, auditors sometimes do assume express contractual duties to 
undertake such an investigation, such as when they are engaged to conduct forensic 
audits.  As with lawyers who undertake contractual duties to conduct due diligence, this 
signals that auditors command the requisite professional skills and ingenuity to perform 
this service.   
 
 In the certification category, for lawyers an example concerns written legal 
opinions.  They often provide these to clients for various securities-related matters and 
sometimes prepare them for others at their client’s request.  A good example of the latter 
arises when an underwriting agreement contains a condition to the underwriter’s duty that 
it shall first have obtained an opinion from issuer’s counsel concerning the legality of the 
transaction and compliance, as to form, with federal securities regulations.   
 
 Even so, these lawyers’ opinions are narrowly drawn and addressed.  The scope is 
limited in several ways, including by providing so-called “negative assurance.”  This 
means that the opinion states that the law firm conducted such investigations as it deemed 
necessary and that, in the course of those investigations, nothing came to the firm’s 
attention that would prevent it from opining that the transaction is lawful and disclosure 
in conformity with regulations.  Any right of reliance is expressly limited to addressees, 
usually a client’s board of directors (or, sometimes, an underwriting firm of a client’s 
securities).  Apart from contractual requirements, failure to provide an opinion does not 
expose a lawyer to legal liability or even reputational damage.  Nor, in most cases, does 
the rendering of such opinions expose lawyers to any significant liability due to the 
narrow manner of drafting and addressing them.   
 
 For auditors, the certification category concerns written comfort letters.  These are 
generated and assume a form that is functionally equivalent to the lawyers’ opinions.  In 
underwriting contexts, for example, an underwriter’s obligations are conditioned on 
                                                 
153 Reflecting both the stakes and the controversy, accounting standard-setters have rewritten the applicable 
auditing standards on numerous occasions.  See AM. INST. CERT. PUB. ACCT., STATEMENT OF AUDITING 
STANDARD NO. 99, CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT (2002) (version 
currently in effect).  The current standard mainly elaborates on the difficulties auditors face in detecting 
fraud rather than specifying anything resembling a duty to investigate or pro-actively to detect for it.  For 
analysis of predecessor formulations, see Mark F. Zimbelman, The Effects of SAS No. 82 on Auditors’ 
Attention to Fraud Risk Factors and Audit Planning Decisions, 35 J. ACCT. RES. 75 (1997). 
 
154 See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note ___ at 138-46 (“The battle lines seem to have been drawn: the 
profession is content with an emphasis on internal controls, while reformers want enhanced standards 
requiring the auditor to recognize a responsibility to detect material fraud.  For the profession, this latter 
priority carries the prospect of greater litigation exposure.”). 
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receipt of a designated comfort letter from the issuer’s auditors.  As to form, these 
likewise do not require the auditor to conduct any particular investigation and are written 
as negative assurance (stating that the auditor performed such procedures as it deemed 
necessary and that nothing came to its attention which would contradict the statements it 
attests to).  In present practice, evidence suggests that auditors have taken additional 
pains to disclaim any specific responsibility for detecting fraud or illegal acts, echoing the 
profession’s more general aversion to accepting related investigation duties.155
 
 Law could require all of the foregoing services.  It could mandate that lawyers 
perform due diligence in securities transactions and provide formal written certifications 
to designated transaction participants, including shareholders.156  It could require that 
those certifications state affirmatively that disclosure is fair and accurate in all material 
respects.  Law could clarify that auditors are responsible for detecting fraud and insist 
that they provide specific positive assurance to underwriters or other transaction 
participants.   But law has not done so and probably for good reasons.   
 
 First, such blanket and categorical requirements may demand more than is 
necessary.  Not all enterprises require such comprehensive gatekeeper vetting.  Second, 
that might demand more than is possible.  Fraud and other sources of mis-reporting can 
be hidden in ways that no professional could discover.  The risks of error are so high that 
the expected costs to these professionals vastly exceed the price that they could charge 
for backstopping their opinions.  As a result, the professions resist accepting any such 
duties as a political matter.157  This implies, however, that the threat of legal liability can 
backfire.  After all, it is likely that auditors and lawyers have a comparative advantage 
versus underwriters or others to investigate and certify yet, under the existing regime, 
these services may be rendered on sub-optimal terms.158  Designing a system in which 
auditors and lawyers would readily agree to perform these functions—without fear of 
legal liability hanging over their performance—is thus appealing.  
 
 Finally, an additional reason why gatekeepers may be reluctant to undertake 
services of the kind described in the preceding section, even as a matter of contract, is the 
risk of expansive judicial interpretation of any governing agreement.  That is, a law firm 
or auditing firm that expressly agrees to examine an enterprise to uncover mis-reporting 
but fails to do so may expose itself to liability even if the expressly-limited terms of the 
                                                 
155 COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note ___ at 166 & 168 (discussing how the auditing profession is 
“refusing to discuss the prospect for fraud or illegality with other gatekeepers.”). 
 
156 Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note ___, at 1311 & 1313-15, n. 57. 
 
157 COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note ___ at 166 & 168. 
 
158  The greater the professional resistance to a broad mandate, the more likely it is suited to a carrot-based 
merit system. Performing the function successfully yields bonus payments whereas either not performing 
the function or doing so unsuccessfully does not expose the gatekeeper to legal liability or even 
reputational harm.  Furthermore, to the extent that experience with a carrot-based merit system is favorable, 
it could be possible to increasingly substitute it for other existing mandatory duties backed by liability 
imposition. 
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contract do not carry any such guarantee of performance.  This litigation risk can be 
sufficiently high that the expected liability costs of undertaking these functions exceed 
the fair market contract price obtainable for undertaking them.  Given that the services 
could be desirable in many cases, a merit system can fulfill the desire.  This should be 
possible by only slight tinkering with the approach currently taken in such contracts as 
underwriting agreements. 
 
 2.  Contracts — Before turning to examples of contractual arrangements fit for 
adapting to facilitate the carrot-based merit system, consider two threshold attributes of 
the system that will influence its effectiveness.  First, the system’s strength depends on 
generating and channeling sufficient funds to designated gatekeepers to make the system 
cost-effective.159  Compensation must be sufficient to fund an optimal level of G.  
Generating requisite funding to provide the carrots generally can be obtained through 
existing channels.  Transaction-based gatekeeper information-sharing is a fruitful context 
for modification.  The goal would be to develop a mutually rewarding and systematic 
process of information-sharing that draws on resources that already exist in the capital 
formation process.  The major difference would concern the form of contracts compared 
to the existing pattern, especially those prevailing arrangements that generate negative 
assurance.   
 
 Second, all exercises that gatekeepers undertake in the system would be optional.  
They are services that gatekeepers are not otherwise required by law to perform, either 
before or after executing any contractual option to undertake to perform them. As such, 
the system’s strength depends, in part, on dissemination of information concerning the 
system to all capital market participants. True, confidential incentive contracts could 
result in more effective gatekeeping (through discovery of mis-reporting and correcting 
it) but the value would be amplified in proportion to how widely-known the practice 
becomes.160  Participants obtain the signaling value that adopting the system would carry.  
So market investors should understand which clients prefer engaging gatekeepers who 
use the devices and why and which gatekeepers use them and build a reputation for doing 
so.  Enterprises and gatekeepers should understand the extent to which investors value the 
retention of gatekeepers using merit systems.161   
 
 Turning to contractual illustrations, consider the examples given in the previous 
section concerning lawyers’ opinion letters and auditors’ comfort letters.  Both are 
products of underwriting agreements and reflect that those professionals conducted such 
                                                 
159 COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note ___, at 369-70 (observing that “[c]arrots, as well as sticks, then must 
be used” and a challenge is to find “funding . . . to subsidize” these incentives). 
 
160 Cf.  Joseph V. Carcello, et al., Board Characteristics and Audit Fees, 19 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 365 
(2002) (empirical showing of positive relationship between auditor fees and various desirable 
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161 Cf. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, supra note ___, at 410 (noting 
how the pension funds in New York and North Carolina award brokerage business only to firms having 
adopted internal mechanisms to reduce conflicts of interest). 
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investigations as they deemed necessary and that nothing came to their attention that 
prevents providing the certification given.  The professionals earn their fee as a result, in 
accordance with their retention or engagement agreements with issuers.   
 
 Under a carrot-driven contract, in contrast, the professionals would agree with 
issuers, if they elect to do so, to undertake the investigative functions and earn 
compensation to the extent, and only to the extent, that the investigation results in 
discoveries of mis-reporting.  In the best scenarios, those discoveries would result in 
correction and still enable the issuer to access capital markets; but the gatekeepers would 
also be paid in those cases in which their discoveries led to denying that access 
(vetogating). 
 
 Developing contracts to implement these arrangements require support from the 
issuer and underwriter as well as from auditors and lawyers.  The latter professionals 
have every incentive to agree to accept the option.  While the exact parameters of the 
option would be specified in a contract between the issuer and underwriter (the 
underwriting agreement), auditors and lawyers would necessarily need to negotiate with 
issuers for specifications to be set forth in their respective retainer and engagement 
letters.  As discussed further below, the main examples of negotiated provisions would be 
the related compensation and the delineation of what kinds of activities or discoveries 
generate them and how verification of discovery is made.   
 
 Underwriters have incentives to modify existing arrangements too.  First, the 
merit system component need not replace the existing conditions set forth in underwriting 
agreements that generate negative assurance.  Second, underwriters are gatekeepers too 
and they face the general reputation and liability constraints elaborated in the traditional 
theoretical gatekeeping model.  They can protect reputation and reduce liability risk by 
increasing the effectiveness of their fellow gatekeepers.  Indeed, current evidence 
indicates that underwriters are seeking to have auditors perform such functions but 
auditors are unwilling to do so.162  A carrot-based merit system can break the resulting 
stalemate.  Accordingly, it should be desirable, in principle, for underwriters to agree 
with issuers to create optional opportunities for their fellow gatekeepers to actively seek 
to discover and correct mis-reporting. 
 
 Underwriters can thus apply pressure on issuers to move in the merit-system 
direction.  For many issuers, moreover, such a strategy should be attractive.  True, those 
enterprises that are institutionally dedicated to mis-reporting would find the proposal 
repellant.  But the resulting differentiation between issuers in favor of and opposed to the 
system creates the desired signaling device on which the system’s strength depends.  For 
investors, this would separate enterprises according to the relative probability that their 
reporting is fair compared to misleading.  
 
 Furthermore, it is rare for entire enterprises to be institutionally dedicated to mis-
reporting.  Most commonly, individual agents within an enterprise wish to mis-report.  In 
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either case, however, the reforms made in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act create internal 
governance structures that can be useful to developing the merit system.  True, 
willingness to adapt arrangements to implement one likely would have to originate with 
an issuer’s board of directors, although it is not impossible to believe that many senior 
executives would find it attractive too.  Board audit committees are a particularly likely 
source of support (and other board committees could be too, such as a legal compliance 
committees respecting services to be rendered by lawyers).   
 
 The audit committee is particularly promising because it wields considerable 
power.  Indeed, many believe that the most important of the changes in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act is audit committee power over auditors.163  This empowerment is designed to 
reduce agency costs that arise from the separation of ownership from control.  To the 
extent that investors would find it desirable for an issuer’s lawyers and auditors to 
provide more assurance to underwriters or others concerning reporting integrity, it would 
be prudent for audit committees to do the same.  Adopting a merit system for gatekeepers 
is propitious. 
 
 Audit committees certainly possess the internal power necessary to generate this 
kind of change.  Indeed, for audit committees who believe that the carrot approach is 
conceptually appealing in principle, this aspiration can be stated expressly as part of the 
audit committee’s own charter.  To the extent that the issuer assumes responsibility to 
fund any bonus compensation that lawyers or auditors earn in the exercise, they should be 
able to command requisite resources internally from the enterprise under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act’s provisions requiring that issuers give audit committees a sufficient budget.  
Committees can argue, credibly, that associated costs will be vastly outweighed by saving 
the costs of later-discovered mis-reporting.  
 
 The issuer would not have to fund 100% of the awards.  Rather, award funding 
would be subject to negotiation between the issuer and underwriter.  The issuer could 
agree to pay all of the compensation or the issuer and the underwriter could agree to share 
designated portions.  Funding a portion of the payout will be appealing to the underwriter 
according to its calculations, under the traditional theory of the gatekeeping model, of 
reputation and liability costs that result from later-discovered mis-reporting.   
 
 Triggers for the awards would likewise be subject to negotiation, with certain 
threshold levels necessary to earn compensation and certain kinds of error or irregularity 
specifically included and excluded. The parameters would reflect the difference between 
activities that the related gatekeeper has or does not have an independent legal duty to 
discover or correct.  In delineating these boundaries in the underwriting agreement, all 
participants would contribute—not only issuers and underwriters, but also auditors and 
lawyers.  
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 As noted, resulting incentives should make this system enticing to the 
professional service firms of auditors and lawyers.  Even so, those firms could increase 
its appeal and effectiveness by designing internal compensation systems through which 
the contingency payments for discovery are channeled to appropriate personnel.  Among 
other contributions, this would facilitate the prescription, noted earlier, to create 
mechanisms that support channeling negative information through a chain of reporting.164
 
 The philosophical aspects of the carrot-based merit system could be reflected 
more broadly within such firms as well.  For example, among auditing firms, partner 
compensation is generally tied to generating revenues from consulting practices, 
attracting audit work and, since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, on designing and 
testing systems of internal control.  Since the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) was created, moreover, it has encouraged auditing firms to allocate 
resources, and compensation, to functions designed to improve auditors’ technical 
competence.165  Without diminishing the importance of any of these ways of allocating 
resources, sufficient flexibility appears that would make an incremental reallocation to 
carrot-based investigation and certification prudential. 
 
 All contracts governing a carrot-based merit system, and their interpretation, 
require attention to the (ironic) risk that gatekeepers will fabricate mis-reporting to obtain 
additional compensation.  As a theoretical matter, of course, this risk also exists in the 
current reputation-and-liability model of gatekeeping.  For example, auditor reputations 
increase in value by repeated demonstrations of integrity, whether this is achieved by 
detecting and correcting mis-reporting or more public statements such as resigning from 
an engagement.  That can create a strategic temptation to be too strict on clients.    
 
 Similar strategic mis-fires could arise under a carrot-based merit system.  To 
police for such temptations in this context, contracts would specify not only the kinds of 
discoveries that generate compensation, but also provide for a verification procedure.  For 
payments by issuers to gatekeepers, this verification can be performed by audit 
committees; in the case of gatekeeper firm payments to its own personnel, special 
verification committees should be established.  In general, however, it should be easier to 
detect fraud about fraud than fraud itself.  
 
 3.  Teams — Beyond the foregoing examples of altering underwriting agreements 
to expand the probable scope of lawyer and auditor undertakings, a wide range of 
contexts exist in which a carrot-based merit system could be deployed.  These include 
any context in which one or more teams of lawyers or auditors or other professionals 
participate in reviewing, preparing or correcting matters that require public disclosure.  
Traditionally, enterprises retain one law firm and engage one auditing firm in these 
exercises and often, especially for law firms, they dispatch a single team of experts who 
                                                 
164 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
165 Remarks of Mr. Daniel Goelzer, Board Member, PCAOB, Columbia University Law School’s 
conference, “Gatekeepers Today: The Professions after the Reforms” (Sept. 29, 2006). 
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work together on the matter.  Commonly, another enterprise participating in the 
transaction likewise hires and dispatches lawyers and auditors (as with counterparties in a 
business combination or financing arrangement).  
 
 In a carrot-based merit system, these traditional approaches may warrant further 
adjustment.  For example, as Professor Coffee has explored heuristically, it might be 
possible to imagine an enterprise engaging two separate teams of lawyers for a matter or 
retaining a single law firm but having that firm dispatch two separate teams of lawyers.166  
This construct is designed to reflect the dual role that lawyers play in such contexts, 
serving as both advocate and advisor to the enterprise on the one hand while also serving 
a public gatekeeping function on the other.  Tensions result.   Using two firms or teams 
can enable segregating these functions so that each can discharge professional 
responsibilities without ethical dissonance.  While so deploying two teams can be 
expensive and redundant, the notion should not be dismissed altogether. 
 
 First, consider how auditors functionally deploy the equivalent of two teams to 
work on a single engagement.   Audit firms dispatch engagement teams to work on 
particular audits but these must report to and interact with partners and other teams in the 
firms’ national offices.  The national office is functionally equivalent to an incentives-
driven supervisory team.  The novelty that a carrot-based merit system could inject is a 
willingness of either team to deploy more rigorous auditing techniques, as where teams 
may elect to perform the more rigorous testing required in forensic audits than in 
traditional financial statement auditing.   
 
 This auditing practice of using an engagement team subject to national office 
supervision has a parallel in the organization of many large corporate law firms.  Many 
maintain internal policies that subject individual retentions to internal review. Examples 
include having a committee of partners review new clients and obtaining second- or 
third- partner review of firm opinions on certain matters before issuing them. These 
structures were famously implemented by the New York law firm of White & Case in its 
agreement settling charges arising from its role in the notorious National Student 
Marketing fraud of the 1970s.167
 
 Second, among lawyers, there invariably are two teams on cooperative 
transactions—usually from different law firms.  In securities offerings, both underwriters’ 
and issuers’ counsel participate in due diligence exercises that are designed to enable 
preparing fair disclosure in the prospectus for the offering.  In the context of business 
combinations, each side, buyer and seller, retains lawyers to negotiate the governing 
agreement, along with voluminous disclosure schedules, on the basis of respective due 
diligence investigations.  Likewise, opinions in those transactions often are prepared by 
both sides’ lawyers.   While both sides seek to protect their own client’s position, they are 
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167 See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,027 (D.D.C. 1977). 
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most effective when generating maximum gains from the transaction—creating value, not 
just claiming it.168   
 
 In transactions with two teams, it should be possible to design assignment and 
compensation contracts that, while facilitating meeting professional responsibilities, also 
enable promoting lawyers’ role as gatekeepers.  The ideal would be contracts in which 
one team can be designated as the closing team whose mission is to accomplish the 
transaction and the other as the gatekeeper whose assignment is to perform due diligence 
and certification functions.  The closing team can be compensated conventionally, as 
based on billable hours, while the gatekeeping team can be compensated according to a 
base rate plus contingent bonuses in respect of discovered mis-reporting (whether or not 
corrected).  Obviously, addressing the specific professional responsibilities would be 
difficult, but the example suggests the vitality of Professor Coffee’s heuristic. 
 
 Third, enlisting and designating two separate legal or audit teams for a transaction 
copes with how complicity risks are higher when individuals and teams within a 
gatekeeper or among different gatekeepers are capable of conspiring.  This is an 
important insight accompanying Professor McGowan’s proposal to offer immunity to 
lawyers who activate vetogates.  Creating incentives to activate vetogates weakens the 
capacity to conspire.169  Of course, participants in transactions must be capable of 
cooperation to a large extent and this capacity must be preserved.  A good way to do so is 
to dispatch two teams with designated assignments, each of which would be cooperative 
to the end of (a) closing a transaction (b) using fair reporting.  Each would have 
incentives that contribute to promoting that twin result. 
 
  Finally, the dual-team approach reflects the insights from Mr. Buffett’s and 
Professor Painter’s bilateral professional service retention models.170  Two teams facing 
different incentives will be inclined to exert pressure against each other.  Mis-reporting 
temptations by the closing team are offset by opposite incentives of the gatekeeping team 
and temptations to overzealousness among the gatekeeping team are constrained by 
contrary incentives of the closing team.171  Using teams to facilitate a carrot-based merit 
system would be particularly powerful when issuers themselves fund the resulting 
compensation—an innovation that audit committees could pioneer for the sake of 
investor prosperity. 
 
                                                 
168 See DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 19-21 (2nd ed. 2002) (excerpting 
DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 29-30, 33-35 (1986)). 
 
169 See McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot?, supra note 1, at 1833-36. 
 
170 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
171 Other professional gatekeepers use separate teams from multiple firms or use multiple teams within a 
single firm, including co-lead managers in underwriting transactions, lead banks in bank lending 
syndicates, and risk and rating teams within rating agencies.   
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 The foregoing examples are not intended to be either complete or exhaustive.  
Instead, they suggest some ways that gatekeeping teams can be deployed, using merit-
based compensation, to promote gatekeeper effectiveness.  Together with the more 
explicit descriptions of contractual examples discussed in the preceding section and the 
predicate intuitions, they are offered to introduce the possibility of promoting capital 
market gatekeeper effectiveness using carrot-based merit systems.  Before concluding, 
the following section explores additional possible attributes of such systems. 
 
C.  Public Recognition  
 
 Apart from cash compensation channeled by contract to effective gatekeepers and 
team design, a broader range of public recognition could form part of a carrot-based merit 
system to supplement the traditional gatekeeping model.  A proposal to provide public 
recognition raises and requires addressing several additional issues warranting analysis.  
These are cultural challenges to implementing the system, the relation of compensation to 
professional morality and the potential that the system could create excessive incentives 
among gatekeepers to activate vetogates. 
 
 1.  Culture — Effective gatekeeping relies not only on the conditions of reputation 
and liability threats but on broader cultural foundations that make those stimuli 
function.172  In contemporary culture, media, regulators and scholars concentrate on 
persons who failed to perform their functions. These persons or firms are lambasted in 
the press, face liability at the hands of authorities, and are given analytical attention by 
scholars inquiring into diagnostics that can yield normative policy implications. Much 
rarer are media, regulatory or scholarly attention on those gatekeepers who perform their 
functions successfully.  For this reason alone, a merit system should have some appeal to 
highlight the degree to which gatekeeping is effective. 
 
 In contrast, such public recognition is showered on “heroes” who, after the fact, 
exercise authority to prosecute the villains.  Consider Elliot Spitzer.  As Attorney General 
of the State of New York, he earned public “hero” status for his enforcement of laws in a 
wide range of contexts in the post-bubble fallout.  That status, in turn, played a significant 
role in his subsequent election as Governor of that State.  True, private whistleblowers 
such as Kathy Wilkens of Enron shared in some of the limelight.  But that too occurred 
long after the scandal had incubated, and no similar national “heroes” appeared amid the 
numerous other scandals of the era.  More to the point, no heroes were identified at other 
enterprises who may have avoided similar fates of fraud because of the effective presence 
of gatekeepers in their midst. 
 
 A more proactive strategy of public recognition could be pursued.  Unlike with 
gatekeeping contracts or team structures used to implement a merit system, public 
                                                 
172 Cf. Macey, A Pox, supra note ___, at 331 (noting that factors other than corporate governance and 
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recognition does not necessarily require cash (or at least not large amounts).173  A good 
model of public recognition are the Malcom Baldridge National Quality Awards, named 
for a US Commerce Secretary and awarded annually since 1988 to US innovators who 
demonstrate exemplary leadership in designated performance categories.174  For capital 
market gatekeeping, the SEC or the PCAOB could adapt this honor to recognize an 
Auditor of the Year or Lawyer of the Year for successful correction of mis-reporting or 
vetogating.  After all, it is more socially valuable to make heroes out of auditors and 
securities lawyers ex ante than of prosecutors (or plaintiffs’ lawyers) ex post. 
 
 The parameters of any such formal mode of public recognition must be drawn 
carefully, however. This is necessary to appreciate a more general potential obstacle to 
adding a carrot-based merit system to the gatekeeping function: a traditional cultural 
aversion to ratting in the United States.175  This aversion arises from how competing 
values such as loyalty are implicated.  These can be in tension with whistle-blowing or 
gatekeeping, which are forms of ratting.  The strength or frequency of the aversion is 
essentially impossible to estimate and can certainly be overstated.  Yet the existence of 
governmental bounty programs (such as those of the IRS and SEC) and of qui tem 
actions suggest that inducements are necessary to entice US persons to rat on fellow 
citizens.176
 
 On the other hand, for capital market gatekeepers, these tensions should be more 
attenuated than for other citizens.  After all, the professional status of most gatekeepers 
embraces probity and integrity more compatible with discovery and correcting mis-
reporting than with loyalty in acquiescing to it.  This tendency is probably strongest for 
auditors, whose training and self-identification entails professional skepticism that is a 
cognate of ratting.  The common designation of the profession as a public watchdog bears 
this out.   
 
 In contrast, lawyers face conflicting values as a result of the traditional advocacy 
model of that profession and the resulting principles of confidentiality epitomized in the 
attorney-client privilege.  Yet while lawyers have not historically assumed this identity, it 
                                                 
173 Creative public funding devices may nevertheless be possible, with funds generated from such sources 
as the Fair Funds for Investors provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, PCAOB’s budget generated from 
public company accounting support fees, royalties on sales of FASB products, fines imposed by PCAOB 
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otherwise.  One reason to prefer private arrangements to such public devices is the risk that the government 
agencies will not actually pay.  See Ferziger & Currell, supra note ___, at 1155 (noting Congressional 
testimony of Duke Law Professor James Cox “that the biggest problem with a proposed insider trading 
bounty program would be the SEC’s likely unwillingness to actually give out any rewards”). 
 
174 See National Institute of Standards and Technology, Baldridge National Quality Program, 
http://www.quality.nist.gov/.  
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should be possible, at least for securities lawyers, to adapt to it.   For them, a carrot-based 
merit system can help with the transition.   
 
 Either way, however, the public recognition for such activities must be carefully 
drawn to be in tune with the public’s propensity toward aversion to ratting.  The “heroes” 
must be portrayed in much the way that Elliott Spitzer was presented.  They must be seen 
as dedicated, public-minded professionals, perhaps seeking to advance their own 
careers—as Spitzer certainly did—but only in a way that is consistent with the public 
interest—likewise, as Spitzer did.177
 
 2.  Functions — The prevailing lack of public recognition for successful 
vetogating may also be due, in part, to the historical emphasis on gatekeeping functions 
as opposed to whistleblower functions.  That is, gatekeeper models are designed to act 
internally within an enterprise and not shine the public spotlight on it.  But the concept of 
a vetogate would alter that practice when an enterprise is denied access to capital 
markets.   
 
 A good example occurred in the 1970s when the auditing firm of Arthur Young 
blew the whistle on, and withheld support from, the Lockheed Corporation amid the 
foreign government bribery scandals of that era.178  Lockheed and its top managers had 
much to gain from concealing the scheme. But Arthur Young activated a vetogate that 
temporarily denied Lockheed’s access to capital markets. As theory would predict and 
explain, in Professor Kraakman’s terms, Arthur Young had little to gain and much to lose 
from complicity.  And Arthur Young received considerable recognition for its refusal in 
the contemporary press.179
 
 In contrast, today’s sensibilities shower less praise on vetogates and instead 
display a diagnostic tendency to examine pathological cases for lessons about what went 
wrong and then generalize from these for systemic reform.  With that orientation, it is 
unsurprising that policymakers and scholars incline toward refashioning the duties and 
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liability strategies in search of optimal deterrence.  An alternative, less common, 
approach would examine how and why things go well.  True, reputation and liability risks 
may influence a professional’s decision-making, but more fundamental norms drive 
professional behavior too.180  Many professionals who perform effectively do so to obtain 
satisfaction from a job well done—not for fear of liability or damaging reputation.  What 
should the consequences be of doing a good job?   
 
 For many critics, it appears that doing a required job is simply the norm and doing 
it well deserves no special praise.  But if one condemns those who fail in their job, why 
not be willing to recognize those who perform their jobs well?  A more general and 
affirming response to good work is recognition.  This can assume many forms, from a 
simple expression of gratitude (as in a supervisor’s pat on the back or handwritten 
note)181 to a more compelling public expression of appreciation.  A carrot-based merit 
system would envision that kind of public recognition for vetogating (in addition to the 
form of cash discussed in the preceding section).  
 
 For some readers, this may raise an objection.  It may appear that the system is 
designed to pay gatekeepers extra for doing what they ought to do—whether required by 
law or by professional or other non-legal commands such as moral principles.182  As to 
legal requirements, the proposal preempts this objection to avoid problems of contract 
law’s pre-existing duty rule.183  That is, the proposal envisions a system that provides 
compensation or recognition for performing functions not otherwise required by law.  As 
to professional or moral principles, the objection is harder to meet, for it is valiant to 
emphasize such commands and project ethical appeals to induce superior gatekeeping.  
Yet it seems more realistic to appreciate how cash and public recognition can contribute 
to realizing those aspirations.   
 
 Perhaps paradoxically, cash and recognition may even be edifying vehicles to 
reinforce professional or moral principles.  Consider how the structural and systemic 
forces catalogued earlier may have reduced gatekeeper incentives to invest in reputational 
capital.184  Among audit firms, for example, the phenomenon of cross-selling (bundling 
consulting assignments to auditing engagements) changed auditing culture from 
professionalism to commercialism.  Since reversing culture is difficult,185 tools that work 
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within existing culture are more promising than those alien to it.  A carrot-based merit 
system works within existing commercial culture by paying people bonuses when 
successful as detectives.  That should induce investment in reputation despite contrary 
forces and that, in turn, would promote an ethical sense of probity and integrity among 
those so compensated.   
 
 3.  Effects — The rhetorical term vetogate used in this Article is taken from 
politics, but capital markets differ.  The concept of vetogates in capital markets may be 
medicine too strong.  In the years after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed, critics 
complained of what they saw as a decline in US competitiveness in global capital 
markets. They cited a decrease in the frequency and size of initial public offerings in New 
York compared to London and a decline in the number of public companies listed in the 
US.186   Implicitly, these critics essentially argue that gatekeeping can be too effective.  A 
carrot-based merit system, in this view, is the last thing these markets need.  This critique 
warrants considering how the concept of vetogates works in legislative theory and how it 
relates to capital market theory. 
 
 Certain theories of the legislative process emphasize the presence of multiple 
vetogates.   These refer to choke points in the legislative process that enable participants 
to obstruct the passage of legislation.187  Examples include Congressional bicameralism, 
Presidential presentment, supermajority voting (as with overriding a Presidential veto), 
formal standing rules, Senatorial rules concerning filibusters and cloture, the committee 
and conference reporting systems and even informal legislative mores.188 Numerous 
gatekeepers participate in activating these vetogates, including the President, as well as 
committee chairs, senior Senators and House members and, especially, lobbyists.189   The 
result is that the vast majority of bills do not become law, a deliberate strategy designed 
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to minimize the risk of sub-optimal lawmaking as well as to promote confidence that law 
is supported by consensus.190
 
 Compared to the legislative process, the capital formation process is both 
modestly parallel and radically different.  The parallel concerns how system design 
contains numerous vetogates.  Consider the many opportunities to activate vetogates in a 
typical securities transactions, say a public offering: hiring an underwriter to sell it; 
attracting securities analysts to follow it; retaining lawyers to negotiate and document the 
terms and furnish legal opinions; engaging auditors to audit financial statements (and 
internal controls) and offer related comfort letters; for debt, getting a rating agency to rate 
it; requesting that the SEC declare the related registration statement effective; and closing 
the transaction.  Without being scientific about it, there appear to be as many vetogates in 
capital market transactions as there are in the legislative process.  
 
 The radical differences between vetogates in legislative processes compared to 
capital market transactions concern the purpose of these devices and the orientation of 
participants.  Vetogates in legislative processes are intended to reduce the probability of 
passing legislation and this is seen as necessary to promote the appearance and 
achievement of consensus and the effectiveness of laws.  For securities transactions, the 
cultural milieu is nearly exactly the opposite.  Participants generally want to facilitate the 
deal, to enable the financing, to form or transfer capital.   
 
 Indeed, many critics of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imply that more capital market 
transactions are better and more public companies are better—they criticize the Act’s 
fallout by showing proportionately fewer public offerings made in New York compared 
to London and a falling number of public companies in the US.191  But becoming and 
staying a public company historically were—and probably should be—badges of honor.  
To sustain that designation, it should not necessarily be easier to become or continue as a 
public company than it is for a bill to become law.192   
 
 It is unlikely, moreover, that vetogating in capital markets would or should ever 
be more common than vetogating in legislative processes.  Indeed, under the carrot-based 
merit system introduced in this Article, capital market vetogates are not discretionary in 
the same way they can be in the legislative process.  Rather, the system installs additional 
cross-checks designed to counterbalance competing incentives.  Managers who are 
inclined to mis-report when doing so earns lucrative gains from stock options currently 
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face gatekeepers whose compensation is not tied to the accuracy of reporting, except 
through vague reputation constraints and liability risks.  Tying gatekeeper compensation 
to discovering and correcting mis-reporting would neutralize contrary incentives.  The 
potential risk the system raises of excessive vetogating is further reduced by the 
continuing presence of participants with strong incentives to get deals or audits done.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Regulatory reform and scholarly literature concerning capital market gatekeepers 
has concentrated on penalties for failing to meet legal duties or structures to promote 
investment in reputations.  Imposing penalties to deter acquiescence is a natural response, 
in part because acquiescent gatekeepers assume a vivid public posture amid publicized 
fraud.  Penalties may even be necessary to achieve the optimal level of deterrence.  
Promoting investment in reputations for integrity likewise produces a valuable 
contribution to capital market integrity.  
 
 Yet underappreciated in practice and theory is the possibility of rewarding 
gatekeepers for exercising vetogates—for denying access to public capital markets unless 
reporting corrections are made.  This innovation should have considerable purchase when 
one considers how the reputational constraint and liability threats were insufficient to 
deter widespread ineffective gatekeeping during the late 1990s and early 2000s.  While 
reformers and scholars are right to focus on how to improve the traditional mechanisms, 
the additional policy lever of carrots for vetogates at least warrants consideration it has 
not been given. 
 
 After all, the inventory of legal liability constraints on securities professionals is 
extensive, while no similar set of carrots exists. A carrot-based merit system may be 
complex and cumbersome and raise hosts of difficult challenges of design, 
implementation and risks of over- or under-inclusiveness.  But while this may be so, a 
carrot-based merit system is less complex and less cumbersome than the existing legal 
system of duties and liability that has been in use for many decades.193  A main 
difference is that lawyers and legal scholars are familiar with the intricacies of the current 
duty-and-liability system but must begin their encounters with a carrot-side complement 
without that cognitive benefit. 
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